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INTERNATIONAL 'AND COMPARATIVE ENVIR ·ONMENTAL· LAW 
. VOLUME I . ISSUE 1 FALL/ WINl ER 2000 
by Glenn · Wiser and Donald Goldbe1l1 
The ' Center for International 
Environmentol Law, UNFCCC 
and the {(yolo Prolo.col. 
A s the Earthconrinues .to 
experic;nce recor~ -b~eaking 
temperatures, sCienOsts 

increasingly point to human <"\ctivities­
especially the burning of fossil fuels-as 
the culprit. Rising concentrations of 
heat-retaining gases are disrupting the 
delicate balance between bur Earth and 
its atmosphere. The resulting impacts 
include biodiversity loss, melting polar 
ice cap~; and an alarming increase in 
severe weather even·ts .As the Earth 
conti.nues to experience record­
breaking. temperatures, concern is 
_growing over carbon dioxide (C02 ) 
and other greenhouse gas' emissions 
stemming from human.activities, 
specifically the burning (jf fossil fuels. 
As concentrations of heat-retaining 
gases continue to grow over time, they 
illcreasingly disrupt the delicate balance 
between the Earth and its annosphere . 
The resulting detrimental impacts 
include ozone depletion, biodiversity 
loss and disruption of the climate 
systeIll · 
In 1992, the United Naiions 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) emerged from the 
Earth Summit iIi Rio to address this 
pressing global problem. Almost 
F EAT U RE ART I CL E 

Hybrid Liability Under Kyoto. Protocol1 
The goal of the Climate Change 
Program At the Center for International 
Environmental Law (CIEL) is to 
protect the e~rth's climate system 
against pollution and the potential 
threat of global warming. Under.the 
United Nations Framework 
Coiwcntion for Climate Change 
(UNFCCq" CIEL has piayed an 
integral role in advising major players in 
the international policy arena in 
(continued on page 2) 
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immediately, the limitations of the noil-' 
binding targets sent in the UNECCC 
became apparent and in 1997 the 
. Conference of the Parties (COP) met 
and agt;eed upon theKyo1:o Protocol. 
The developed countries, listed in 
Annex B to. the ProtocQI, commit 
themselves·to reducing the!r collective 
emissions of six key greenhouse gases 
by' at least 5%, as measured against a 
base year of 1990, by the end of the 
period from 2008-2012 r'commitment 
period") , Certain exceptions were ma<;ie 
for the economics in transition of the 
former Soviet Block. The Climate 
Change Program at the Center for 
International Environmental Law 
(CIEL) strives to protect the Earth's 
climate system while simultalrcously 
promoting oth.cr erivironmel1tal and 
social concenis, such as forest 
conservation, biodiversity protection, 
and human rights .. CIEL has played an 
integral role advising major players in 
the international policy arena hmv to 
work towards a sustainable, enforceable 
emissions reduction framework. We 
have attended every session of trye 
Conference of the Parties since . the 
United NationsFramew~rk 
Convention for Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)2eritercd into fixee. CIEL 
has been intimately involved in the 
negotiations surrouqding the Kyoto 
Protocol,' which for the ticst time . 
establishes binding, numerical emissiqns 
redtiction targets fix industrialized 
countries. 
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American University's Washington College of Law has been a leader in the emerging t1e1ds of 
international anti col~lparative environmental law since 1990, when WCL and the Center for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL) established the J<)int Research Program f(lr 
International and Comparati\;c EnvirOllmental Law: The program prO\'ides a interdisciplinary" 
setting flIT training future leaders in environmental law. The curriculum consiSts of over twelve 
courses including In~ern'ational Environmental Law,C:omparati\'e Environmental Law, Trade 
and the Environment, Human Rightsand thc Environmcrft and Comparative Environmcntal 
Impact Assessmen,t. l:he program also organizcs workshops, symposia and supports research by 
students and leading legal scholars. Thc rcsult is a cooperative effort that pro\'ides studcnts with 
a dynamic lean1ing environment; scholars with a stimulating atmosphere for conducting practical 
research and young la\\')'crs with exciting opp(~rtunities fClr beginning their environmental law ' . 
careers. Indeed, mali" students havc gone on to Forni their own environmental law 
organizations ar~lUnd 'the world ;. '. . 
With this tradition in mind, we are pleased to' introduce the inaugural issue of luten-latiotlal & 
ComparatiJ'e E1IlJiro1l111Cl'ItaILall' (ICEL). It is th.e product ofa divcrse group oO.n. and 
LL.M. students working under the· guidance of CIEL. The goal of thisncwsktter is to provide 
timely information and analy~is on issues relating to international and comparative 
environmental law and policy. IeEL's format of short articles and featurcs is intended telr 
practitioners, as well as policymakers, law professors ,l1ld students \vho require timely and 
concise analysis. 'VI.' apprl=ciate your subscription and welcome your feedback. 
Thomas C. Higdon Durwood Zaekle 

Editor- In-Chief President, elf:!. 
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working towards a sustainable, 
enforceable emissions reduction 
fi-amework. CIEL has been 
intimately in\'olved in the 
negotiations surruunding the 
Kyoto Protocol\'and has 
attellded Conference of the 
Parties meetings since their 
'induction to help achie\'e the 
adoption of the pmposed . 
framework. 
Introduction to Kyoto 
One of the Kvoto Protocol's most significant features 1S 
the incorporation of market­
based mechanisms for 
. "cooperative implementation" 
. (CI) designe.d to allow Annex I 
countries to achie\'e their 
. required emission reductio'ns at 
the least possible cost, 
No internatiol1al environniental 
agreement to dat~ has relied on 
flexible market mechailisnis to 
the extent called tor in the Protocol. The Protocol contains 

fi.)ur CI mechanisms: joint fultillment OF, Articll' 4 )., joint 

implementation (]1, Article 6), the Clean Dcvdopment 

Mechanism (CDM, Article 12), and international t'missions 

trading (lET, Artick 17). The common tCature of thesc 

1l1echanisl11s is that they allow for the transfer of g~eenhouse 

gas (GHG) emissitms units betwecn Parties to the Protocol. 

~one of the. CI 111echanisms are fully dctined in the 

Protocol, and they all requirc significJlltaddinonal 

cl<irification by the Parties. ~cvcrthdess, it is apparent that 

how these 111echanisms arc elaborated is certain to influence 

both thl' implerpcntation of, al)d compliance with, the 

obligations ()f the llrotocol. 

Elaboration' ofthe mechanisms will require aiulysis of a . 
number of complex issw:s, many of which ha\'l: no prccedent 
in international en\'ironmental law. The secretariat of the' 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC ) does 
not includc Article 4 as a CI mcclunism, but docs include 
"activities implemented jointly," which arc not discLlsscd in 
this paper. Annex [ countries-rctel' to devdop~d coumrics 
and those with economit;s in transition as listed in Annex I 
. to the FCCC. These countries haw 'accepted quantified 
emission reduction (.,1' limitation c01l1mitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Thc term "implementation" refers to 
.obligatioils during thl' commirment period, and 
"compliancc·" refers to obligations at thcend of the 
commitment period. 
wntillued on page 10 
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ALASKA: 

The Co.nfl·c ed State of'ANWR,' 

"We. /tccd to opm up the A NHlR to IIi! c.\ plol'nti(il/" - SOt. 
Frun!, ,HUrlW1J',dd . 
"A NWI will be line (~f' my /i'r.it priorities," - 11,'1' ident-cleft 
Cellllfe Emil 
Alaska's Conflict () stilte in tltc U.S: is n1<ire clOL,ldCli in lll ystiQ,l1l: tban 
Alasb , Its legcnd has becn sha~x:d through th~Nliterature of Jackf mdon-, hc flcld notcs of John 
~luir, .111q the oral histo ry ( f adl'l'nturers and prospectors 
that han~ ventured ac ross the I'a~t and remote re~i()n . Alaska 
c()l1jure ~ i ages of natuf ~ at its wildcst'. \Yi lliJI1l~BroJlson 
once desc n b d Alaska :1,- the "last grand advcn tun:, the 
ultimate sag, in co llt1ucst of Noi,th Am rica," Today, 
howevLLr, the adv 'noi re 'is over, and thc conqucst is 
cumple rc; but a saga continues. Since the Klondike gold 
, rush rha't began in '-1897, Alaska has 'been tamed by l11udcrn 
,soCIal and political institutions and a thrivi ng econ~)my which 
is inextriGtblv connected Lo its IegcllliJry natural rcsources. 
Alaska is .lIs() a stat · mired in bitter contlicr, as indllstry 'a'nd 
environmentalists have clash.:d over irs resources. for 
industry, the stakes iI1c1ud<-; rcvenue, jobs, mid the dome. ric 
nced ti:)f fe'sourccs, such as timber, li1inerals, oil, and,t()od' 
supply. For el1\'iron J11entalists, tbe stake~ include some of the 
most dynamic yct fragile ecosystems in tlil: \\'orld ., l11t: 
, ensujng envi ronmental conflicts have polarized AJask.1n 
socie ty and. sp,aw ed !egal questions ;)J1 federalism, resource 
management, and international law. Alaska is at a critical 
juncture \1 here the directiol of its envirc)I,lmental poli'Cy is at 
iSSLle. This is by through the intel sil)!ing debate on \\'/1ether 
ti) aHo\\' the e ." ploration and development of oil in the Arctic 
Natiol1.11 'Wildlife Refug~ (ANWR), the 'resolution of \\'hich 
will have pro fc)lllid impLicali()ns tor the ~llcric environment 
al1(i U.S. agreemen ts under ·(nternarionallaw. 
The Natural Laridsca'pe 
At one-t1fth die size of the continental U,S ., AJaskaextl'l1ds 
over 586,412,miks.(ap~rox . 365,000,000 acres) apCl is the 
, ,1110 t geographically dynamk region in the nation, if not the , 
world ,' Its variolls habitat zones, ranging trom the ' 
, fainf()rests of the somheast to the wet and dry tundra of the 
arctiC, support a rich biodiversity, including functioning 
populatiolls of species tlut arc n()\v extinct [I'om the 
contll1cn tal U.S." Alas~a is Jbo an important repository of 
t reatl'lleJ "'p(xies.' The abumbnt wildlifl:qf Ab$ka 's 
in terior includes healthy populations ()f I (Jose, carib()U, and 
predatory nlallll11als such as wult~ black bear, brown (or 
griz.dy) [-lear, and polar bear. 

bevond its land boundaries to its marine cosystc;n, which , IS 

the 111mt prod uctive in the U.S. and one of the most , 

, producti\'e in the world. ' Its nutrient-rich w,\ters support 
approximately 450 specics of fish, crLIstaceal~s and mollusks; 
'50 spccies of seabirds; and 25 species of marine maml11al's ;: 
[he coast of Alasl a serves as an i mportant site f(Jr le an;llI al 
migration routes of many of these species. 
'For. the scientific willl11unity, Alaska's diverse biological 
stockS and geugraphy advance exccptio nal opportunities w 
collect i;aluable ticlt! data and tu co dun rare obsen'ations' 
of ongoing natural processes, It is still possible fo'r instance 
to stll~iy recent deglacbi:ion (a process that l11ol~kd mllch of 
thc eastern and central u.s. ),' species microe\'olurionafrcr 
dL'blaei,nion, gheial rcfugia, 'nunataks, and ungulate 
migrations, ~IS well as popub~i()n dvnJlllics and trophic 
n:latioqs of viable populations of w()lve~ and bears.7 The 
ind igenous communities of Alasb, which include Nort hwest 
Coast Indians, Illupiaqs, Yupiks, Aleuts, and Athabascans; 
also oftl:r opportunitics t{) study some of the few remaining 
subsistence cllitures 'in thc world. ' 
The Social, Economic;.and Political Landscape 
In contrasr to the'lmvcr states, nan re rema'ins the d()IT}inant 
theml' of Alaskan life. 'With spirited ind 'pel dence and 
unHappable deter1l1ination, Ai .ska\ growing ')(>pulatioll of 
,roughl\' 621,400", brave what Illany would regard as 
, inhospitable , if not uninhabitable, conditions , , u matter 
how Illodern , Alaskan communities ilrc vulnerable t(~ the 
n.arural elements, including wildlitl: that roams illlo city 
limits without thc'bufkr };ones of ;~ubllrbs to red irect th6r 
cm iositv. The population's close relationship with natllre is 
,often characterized bv contl ict. Alaska is still an environment 
where humans 'are pr~y; disjppear in the backcountry, die 
!i-om hypothermia, are swallowed by aVJlanches,and f:ll1 to 
their peril on mOlUltains and glaciers. In short, nature in 
Alaska has retained its ~)o\Vcr to humble individuals-to 
relilind them that despitc hllll1an evolmion and progress, , 
nature can rise up at an\' ,moment, strike, and put the m iri 
thc;ir plac~, 
I f Alaska im'olve's the classic struggle of man verses nature ,~ 
then the state is well positioncd t(j exert its own control over 
the natural enviro ll l1~e1ltthrOligh the industries of oil and 
gas, tishing!II, timber, mining, and agricultui'e. Oil and gas is 
the state's largest in 'dustrv and has driven the economv since 
oil \\'as first di scovered in' 1968 underneath the Prudh~e Bav 
'in the Arctic Ocean . State oil taxes account fi:)r roughl); 80 ­
percent of Alaska's52 .3 bill ion gennal tlllld blH.i'get.
" 
In 
PaD , 4 
part because of sizeable revenues from oil exploration and 
development, there arc no state taxes on income; sales, or 
· inheritance. The Permanent Fund further ensures oil 
exploration and development directly benefits each state 
resident. Approved by ~ons.titutional ~mendmel1tin 1976 in 
part ~'to provide a means of conserving <k portion of the . 
state's revenue from mineral reSQurces to bendit all 
· gdlcrations of A1askans,"l1 the fund's principal is derived 
primarily from dedicated oil res~rves. Since 1976, the fUlid 
has gJ;own to more than S28.i billion (as of}ut1e 30, 2000). 
In fiscal year 2000, The Permanent Fund will pay a record . 
dividend of $1,963.86 to an· estimated 585,800 residents, 
marking the eighth consecutive annual dividei1d increase. L' 
These benefits realized at the individual lev~1 help secure oil 
and other industries public loyalty in their campaigns for · 
cxpanded development of the st;lte's natural resources. 
Industry in Alaska, particubrly oil and gas, wields enorm()us 
bipartisan power over the state legislative and execuhvc 
brariches. 14 . 
Although Alaskan s~)~iety and cconomy is premised on a 
frontier philosophy and a conquest:of-wildernes~ mentality, 
the state is witnessing an emerging envi.ronmental ethic." 
This ethic stems from the ~oncern that Alaskan industries are 
postured to over-exploit the state's ecosystems and risk their 
collapse and, in turn, the collapse ofthe resource-dependent 
economy. This conClTn is evidenced by the proliferation of 
an unprecedented m)mber of envirOnmental organizatiims 
throughout Alaska with state-specifiC agendas.'6 
CQIlser\'ation of Alask;~'s environment is guided by three 
· rationales . .First, because the state ecollom), is resource- " 
dependent, its lin'1its ~annot exceed those of the ecosystems 
llp~m which it depends. If industries sl)ch . as fishing and 
timber are to endure, the state must follow a policy of 
sustainable·. devclopment. Second, an economic development 
policy focusing on resource exploitatiOli is at odds wi.th the 
state's second largest industry of tourism that attracts 1.1 . 
million tourists (nearly ~ioublc the resident 
impc>ssible under the status quo because each side risks 

giving away critical points. Further ·scicntific inquiry is . 

necessary, for example, to identifY ecological systems at risk 

from dcvelopnlent and direct development away from 

. sensitivl; areas or species. If sensitiw areas cannot . be 
avoided, information can lead to the development of new 
nlethods that minimize qr counteract envjronmental. 
impacts. I" Without critical el1\'iroillnental information, state 
and .national poticymakers risk making uninformed decisions 
that can result in unknown· environmental impacts that 
could ha,-:e been avoided. Moreover, "without information, 
the only viable pol.itical alternatives are at the extremes, with 
'winner take all' conf!·OJita.tionspver issues.'~l' "These 
coBfrontations dominate Alaska's political ana social 
landscape and pcevent a sound development policy. 
Tbe Arctic National Wiidlife Refuge (ANWR) 
T
he uncertain direction of state and national policy on 
Alaska's environincnt is e\'idcnced through the intensif)ring : 

dispute over the Arlitic i'\ai:ional Wildlife Refi.lge (Aj\,~VR) : 

. The issue of whether to allow oil exploration and 
development in A~R is gai!Jing national attention and w~s 
highlighted ·in the 2000 presidential campaign as one that 
distinguished the tWo major candidates' positjons on 
environmental policy, with <andidate GO\', George W. Bush 
favoring oil -exploration and candidate V.I'. AI Gore opposing 
·it. ll Three bills have .1lso been introduced in the 106th 
Congress that may determine the fate of AJ.'IWR. SCII . frank 
H. Murkowskr (R-Alaska), Chairman of the Senate Energy 
and Natural Resources Committee, introduced the "National 
Security Enerb'y Act of 2000" that establishes a competitive. 
oil and gas leasing· program wit~ limited tederal oversight. 13 
Rep . Bruce Vento (D-Minn .) and Sen.WiHiam Roth (R-Del. ) 
havc introdlKed legislation that designates the disputed area. 
as wilderness, thereby otlering pcrmailcnt protection.lI 
Environmcntallsts reniain strongly opposed to oil 
pop\llaiion ) to the state each year." Finally, the 

preservation of Alaska's ecosystems is not a state­

specific· cOI\cern. There arc also important 

national and international considerations, 

· prt~mised in part on the transboundary 
· migrations of species sllch as whales,. caribou, 
polar bears, .1I1d birds. In pursuing an agend.a of 
conservation, groups arc finding that the . 
industrystranglchqld on the political process is 
strcngtht;ninK Conservati·on groups have thus 
sought recourse through state and federal courts 
as well.'" 
. Discourse between industries and 
conservationists in Alaska is frustrated by 
incomplc·te environmental inf<>nnation. 'Y The 
'opposing sides must compromise and reach 
consensus to advance a policy of sustainable Artie NC/tiOl~C/1 Wildlife R~f1tge '19.8 million acres 
development; yet these etlorts arc nearly ' South Carolina 19.9.million acres 
-
(1 I" 	 P fl P p, 1,1 Ii cE i l" H U ', I !, 
de\Tlopll1el1t in AN\VR.- A recent statewide publ,ic opinion 
poll indicates Abskali~ an: divided on the issu~ , wirh 45% 
support ing prlltectiOI1 of A~ n.vR frOI11 drilling, and 49% 
()pp~)sing protection measures,'; :In short, the issue is ripe 
fix resolution, the o utcome of which will have profound 
implications fc)r the ellvironment . 
Located in the northe stern part ofthi; stat~, the rcfu Te was 
, established in 1960 and i:. niar'lageJ by the U .S. Fish ;llld 

Wildl1fl: Service (USFWS ) o f the L; .S, Depar I1ll'nt of the 

Intdior. 'h Today; ANvVR indu.dcs nearly '20 million Jcres, 

. with eigh t million Kr '!> design.1tt~d .1S wilderness (the largest 
de,si To,niun ill the NatiolUl Wi ldlife Refuge System)." The 
\'ast and -remote n:gion of A~YVRis one of the most 
compkte, pristine, and undisturbed eceisystems in the· 
\\lurld:" Despite ti'agile gn)wing Ctll1ditions, it conta im 
h mdreds of species of m(Js~cs, wildflowers; grasses, shrubs 
and other plants.'" A!\T\VR also supports the greatest wildlife 
divers ity of anv pr.otected .1re<1 in thl: circu'mpolm' North ~'''' 
" rly 180 specie') of birds;') 45 species of n alllmals;" and 
36 species offIsh ;' inhabit the region , l~ is also home to 
.local Inupiat Eskimo and ;\vich'in Indian COmmlllllties. 
The area of A!\"VVR under dispute is tI e 1,:1 million acres 
tract of land known ' as the" 1002 Area," This Jrp was not 
designated wilderness 'bv the Alaska Nationai lmerest Lands 
, (:on:e;'\'ation An (ANI LC-\) of I Y80 that dOLI bled the size 
of A!\TVVR, bur as a special stll(iy area, " Collgress stated in 
Section 1003 that rill: "production of o il arid gas trom the 
Arc ic NationalWildlik R -fug\: is prohibi ted ~1I1d no leasing 
or other de\'e1npl11cnt leading to prod uction of o il and gas 
6'0111 the [Refuge1shall be undertaken until authorized by 
an act of Congress." Section 1002 ofAl iLeA l>Ll ti ined U1e 
infixl1latioJ1 r~quired be't()re Congress could either grant 
wilderness designatjo!1, or approve oil cxploration dnd 
development. This information included a final report' of 
0 , fWSbiological baseline studies published ill 1986 and a 
L t'gislatio\T Environmental Impaq State'ment (LEIS) 
submittl'd to Congress in 1987 that described the potential 
impacts of development and included thc Secretary of 
Interior's final repdrt and conclusion: The LEIS was based 
in part on intormation gathered from the LJSFWS baseline 
studies, as well as seismic studie!> conducted by a pri\!ate 
exploration firm and funded by a gruup of oil cun;panies. ,; , 
Although the f.'letual conclusions of the baseline studies and 
the LEIS supportcd protection of the 1002 Area, the 
, Sccrctai'v recol11menqed full leasing of the Arctic Refuge 
Coastal PlJin . '" Congre~s, however, passed on resolving the 
i ' °ue of ANWR, fIrst in 1989 when pro-developmcnt 
legishtion Il ear passage \\ as sidelined by the Exxon Valdez 
oil spilt, and again in 1991 when it struck a pro-development 
provision from the . lation:-d Energy Policy Act." In 19Y5, 
Co ngress p .ssed budget legisbtion 'that incli.lded a pr~"'ision 
.l !lo wing de\'c1opm 'nt, but President Cli nton \Ttnt'l the bill , 
1'1 c li nton Adm inistration remains opposed to oi l 
de\'dopmem in AN'vVR. " 
1 ,0, /\ 
ANWR Drilling Rationales and Response 
Supporters of oil explor:nion and development in the 1002 
Area argue: (1) the captured IJil will decrease reliance on 
imported oil to mce t domestic energy needs and provide fix 
national energy security; ,N (2 ) dc\'c!opnwnt \\'ill extend the 
life of the Trans-Alaska Pipcli e si!sttlll (T~\PS) ~lnd mSlI rea , 
s rollg and long-term Alaskan en;nomy; 'O and (3) ad\·a llce . . 
in exploration and drilling technologies will min imize 
illdustry's "footprints"on the ccosystem. 
1. 	 Tht: National Energy SeCl-t,.ity Rationale ill Light oj 

USGS Estimn tes 

Supporters of o il cxpl()ration and development generally citl: 
16 billion barrels of oil (BBO) as the estimated an~ ")lJI~t or 
oil p resent in A:-.!WR.;l i This t1gm:c is misleading Lnscd o n , 
<llialysis of the most recent U.S, Geological Survey (USGS) 
report on the 1002 .area. There ,is Elr less producible oil in 
ANWR than SU~)p mers indicate. In 1998, the USGS 
.	reported its assessl1lcn.t~ of petroleum rcsources in the 1002 
area based on three categories: ( 1) in -place resourccs; (2) 
technically recoverable resources; and (3) economically 
recO\'erable resources , First, in-place resources arc "the 
amount of petroleum contained in acclIl11ulatioi1s e:)f at least 
50 miJli'ul1 barrels of oil (MMBO) without regard to , 
rewyerabilJt\'.'~ The USGS estimates that the 1002 area 
contains bctwecll' II,6 and 31 .5 BEO as incplace reserves. ,,' 
, 	Second, technical.ly recowrable resources are "the '?Iume of 
petroleulll repre~l'nting that proportion o f assessed in-place 
resources that m~ \. be rccoverable L1singcurrcnt recovery 
technology witho ut (egard to cost," '" Tcchnic:lll r 
recoverable resourccs are estimated to be between 4.3 and 
11.8 BHO." Finallv, economically recm; rable resources are 
"that part of ihe technically rccowrable resource fix which 
the costs of disco~t:rv, develop ' ll'nt, and production , 
including the return to capital, can be recovl:red at J given 
well-head price." '" The USGS estinutcs that, ~assllming a 
price of $24 per b~lrreJ; tbere is a 95% chance of t1nding 1-.9 
BRO of economically recoverable oil in the Arctic Rcfuges 
1002 Area; a 5% charice of finding 9.4 RBO; and a 50% 
chance of fInding 5,3 BBO" (present oil prices range 
between $25to $35 per barre!) :" ' 
The 16 BBO figure cited by'supporters of oil development 
represents oil that exists in thenr)r, but oil that is presently ­
irnpossible to extract, The USGS 
estimates of economicafly recoVl'rable resources, in contrast, 
have applicatiori in the real .world . Accordingly, because the 
U .So uses 7 B 130 of oil per year ( 19 MMBO a day), only a ' 
50'Yt, chance exists of Jind ll1 g J 9-month supply of oil in the 
1002 An:a (at 524 per barrel)." The ('ited 16 BRC) estimat.c 
is not \\'ithi-n lhe realll of possibility fc)r either ecorlOmical!y 
or teclmically recoverable resources. Thus, USGS estimates 
of rccoverabl.c res H1rces in the 100.2 Area do not support 
the claim that thl:ir de\'c1opmel twi ll signitlcantly impact 
domestic oil production or pnro1culll imports, espcciall~' 
since aggregate domestic oil production is predominately 
eomprised of c ntJ:iblltion~' tr~)i11 .1 multitude of small- and 
medium-sized oil fIelds I" 
Png f () tl ~,l ' " I, ('IJA~ AN Q COlvlPAFlAf v'E EN VIRC"'. to J T AL 1,1:>,1// 
The national energy security rationale in support of oil 
development in A1\WR is inconsistent with the present 
practice of exporting crude trom AI.lska·'s North Slope (ANS 
crude) to foreign markets. : In 1973, Congre~s enacted 
export restrictions on ANS cr-ude as a significant condition in 
legislation that authorized the constructions of TAPS. Thes\." 
restrictions continued, and \\;ere tightened, throughout tlie 
70s and 80s,~o The export bai1 retlected Congress's 
unwillingness to ppen the .arctic area to oil productioll,in 
light of envi.ronmental ~isks 'and consequences, only to hay\." 
the oil exported as a commodity by major oil companies," 
ANS crude, then, was viewed not ,1S a commodity tor protlt, 
but as a resource .vital to national energy security. However, 
this view shifted in 1995 whm Congress lifted the ban on 
, ANS crude under pressure trol11 oil' companies and the state 
of Alaska.;.2 Sen. Murkowski, a major force behind the lifting 
of the ban, stated the ban "prevented Alaska from exporting 
one,of its most important resource commodities. ";' At 
present, 26,000 to 135,000 barrels ofAl'\JS crudC' are 
exported t<J Asia n'Cry,day.'" To secure political supp<)rt tor 
oil development in AN'VR, its supporters arc again ' 
emp,hasizing 'the value of ANS 'crude as 
a resourn;, clTating the impression that captured oil \vill 
'remain in the U.S, IfA.NS o:ude is to be regarded. as a 
resource critical 'to national ene~gysl'curity, then a 
corresponding policy shitt that would restore the ban on 
ANS crude exports is appropriate . A ban on ANScrude 
'exports could mitigate the need for oil devdoplilem in 
A~VR. 
2, . The Impact ofANWR on TAPS 
Gi\'en the ways in which Alaskans benefit e.conomically from 
oil de\'elopment in the sratt:, it is not surprising that many 
condition their fi~uncial security on TAPS. Completed in 
1977, the pipeline is the only !"neans of moving oil from the 
Prudhoe Bay production sites to the distribution site of 
Valde7. In the absence of additional drilling sites, there is 
concern that the pipdine will run dry or too low for its 
maintenance to be cost etlective. If the pipeline were to 
.dose, it would halt any remaining production in the ;\forth 
Slope and foreclose. the liossibility of future exploration and 
de\ie!0pll1el.1t. USGS estiinates of producible oil in Al'JWR,' 
however, do not suggest the 1002 Area will impact the life 
of TAPS. furthernlore, ' although varied; projection~ of 
. producible oil in the existing North Slope oil fields indicate 
that TAPS will contilllJe to move oil well beYOlidits initial 
life expectancy.;; Sen , Murkowski notes the fields "will 
continue to produce oil well into the next dl'cade. " ;(' One 
report concludes that "oil companies Jl'e expecting the 
pipeline to be operating ul}til at least 2040 withollt oil from 
the Rl'fuge- exceeding tht' original design-life of TAPS by 
almost three decades .,'"'' 
3, blamtry ~footJn'ints, ' or Stomps? . 
Although oil development in AN\NR win provide only 
marginal benefits in the short-term, it will result in 
immediate environmc:ntal impacts, the eftectSofwhich can 
.onlv be measured in geologic time. First, although advances 
in exploration and drilling technology ha\'e decreased, the oil 
industry's "footprints" on the land," the metaphor is 
misleading. The tOotprints may be smaller, but their 
aggregate sum.is gctting larger. W If the Alaska conti1Htcd 
·l002 Area is opened tor drilling, their 
sum would be enormous. While the Pro9ucible petroleum 
at Prudhoe Bay is contained in large and relatively 
contiguous pools, the most recent USGS survey of the l002 
Area suggests the potential oil reserves are distributed among 
many smaller pools.';" This 'wider distribution of oii reservc;s' 
would likely result in a greater impact on a larger 
environment.''' The large number of scattered and remote 
.production sites would require an intricate infrastructure of 
roads, pipelines, power plants, processing facilities, loading 
docks, dormitories, airstrips, gravel pits, utility lines and 
lalidtllls."2 Moreover, the 1002. Area is located m~)re than 30 
miles 'from the end of the .nearest pipeline and more thail 50 
miles ti'om the nearest gran:1 road and l)il ~lJpport facilities. "3 
Although.the 1002 ,Area accounts fur only lO% of ANYVR's 
total acreage, it daim~ most of the Refuge's coastal plain and 
arctic foothi!ls ecological zones and is critically important to 
the ecological integrit~r of the entire Refuge ." .. USFWS 
concludes the effects of oil exploration and development in 
the Refuge would extend far beyondindust~y 'it()otprints," 
and would result in many cumulative impacts. These impacts 
include: (1) the blocking, deflection and disturbance ()f 
wildlite, resulting in decreased populationsin the area; (2) 
toss of subsistence hunting opportunities fur natives such as 
Gwich'in Indians; (3 ) potentiillly fatal interactihns between 
humans and polar bears and brown bears; (4) increased 
predation by arctic fox, gulls and ravens on nesting birds due 
to introducti~m of garbage as a consistent tood source; (5) , 
increased freezing depth~ of rivers and hikes as a r~sult of 
water extraction (for ·ice road and pad construction 'and for 
oil well re-injection), killing overwintering fish and aquatic 
invertebrates; (6) 'alteration of nanll'al dr'linage patterns, 
causing fisheries impacts and changes in vegetation; (75 
deposition of alkaline dust on rllndr~l along roads, impacting 
,vegetation over a much larger area than thc actual width of 
the road; (8 ) cClIltlibutions to pollutallt haze and acid rain 
from nitrogen oxides, methane and particulate matter 
emissions; and (9 ) co'ntamination of soil and water from fuel 
and oil spills.o; USFWS further concludes that oil 
exploration and development will diminish ANWR's 
scientifIC va,lue as a benchmark for understanding important 
ecological and evolutionary processes ."" 
International Implications of Drilling In ANWR 
Since ANWR straddks the U.S.-Canada border and serves as 
critical habitat t()r species that migrate across many national 
boundaries, the proposed development in the 1002 Area has 
several illtcrnational implications. The lJ .S. is party to . 
multiple agreements with several nations that protect specific 
species of wildiife and their habitat, including species found 
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in ANWR. Theseagreel11ents include treaties to protect the 
"',Porcupine' Caribou Herd (PCH), polar bears, and birds . 
.Furthermore, sinn: l~\'idcnn: suggests oil exploration and 
.development may ad\'ersel~' impan these fSopulations, as well 
as ~he environment in gcncral, the U.S. may havc a. duty 
under international environmental law to "pertorm a 
comprehens·ive. environmental impact assessment (EIA).. 
1. 	 The U.S.-Canada Ag1'ee1rimtoll the Comeruation of the 
Porcupine Carib(J1t Herd. 
·hi 1997,the U.S. mter"ed llltO a treaty with Cana.da to 
conscr\'e the P(~H and their habitat .. ' PCH habitat includes 
the arnic coastal tundra uf ANVVR,\vhere female cariboll 
cah><; in late spring, upon the 'Herd's migration fr6m their ' 
wintering grounds south of the Brooks . Range in the U.S .. 
and Cariada,"" The 1002 Area is vital to PCH reproduction 
since it contains a food source that is higher in nutrition, 
more digestible, and more available than in surrounding 
areas, and allows female caribou to build up their fat reserves· 
indmilk-eskntial to the birth of healthy calvt's."" The 
coastal plain calving area is also relatively free of predators.7II . , 
Female caribou with n~wborn calves are highly sl'nsitive and 
will seek -refuge }rom human disturbances as t3r as 1,5 miles 
away." O'it developmerit nuy 'therefore displace' the P(:H 
trom their preferred calving grOlinds, withouts·uitable · 
habitat alternativcs: The overall effects of oil development on 
PCH may iilChlde: \ l) reduction in the amount aild quality 
of preferred for<\ge availJbk during and after calving; (2) . 
restricted access to important coastal insect-relief habitats; 
(3) exposure of the he'rd to higher predation; and (4) 
alteration of an ancient migratory pattern; the effects of 
which cannot be predicted.n These effects ()11 PCH would . 
in turn negative an additional objective of the treaty which is 
to ensure customary and traditional uses of the Herd by . 
rural Alaskans and Canadians, including the G" Tich'in 
Indians wl~o live in the Refuge and oppose oil 
devdopment.?3 Congress ilUY therefore violate both the 
. terms and spirit of the agreement on the conservation ()f the 
Porcupine Cari bou Herd.if it authorizes (Iii development and 
exploration in thc Refuge, . 
2. The Multilateral Ag1'cenunt 011 the Comeruation of . 
. Polar Beiu's 
'The U .S. also recognized the international importance of 
protecti,ng polar bears and their ccosystemswhcn it el1ter~d 
into the multilateral Agreement on the Conservation of 
Polar BCJ.rs with Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the ' . 
U .S.S.R. in 1976.71 The agreement sta~csthat eac.h party . 
"shall takc appropriatc action to protect the ecosystems of 
which polar bears are a part, with special attention to habitat 
components such as dmning and feeding sites am~ migration 
routes:"7; It also ~()ntains provisions to conduct 'scientific 
research and to cnact and 'enforce legislation (Q protect" polar 
bear habitat.;o Allmving oil development in the 1001 Area 
would threaten a habitat component emphasized in the 
treaty as one deserving special attention , since the arctic 
coastal plain provides the most important lalld denning 
habitat t(lr the Beaut()ft St!a polar bcnr population. Studil's 
of radio-collared polar bears of the Beaut()rt Sea populJtion 
between 1981 :.1l1d 2000 showed that "53 dens were located 
on the maililand coast of Alaska and Canada. Of thest," 53 
dCl1S, 22 (42%) were within the Arctic Refuge 's 1002 
Area. " 77 Oil devclopm~nt would create several risks fClr the 
protected species . . First, because polar bears are highly 
· sensitive to human activitks while denning, disruptive 
drilling ma~' prematurely disp"tace females with newborn cubs 
from their winter dens and expose the cubs to harsh ,",'inter 
· conditions f(lr which they are not y~t prq~ared, resulting in 

increased cub mortality." Second, the ·introduction of 

cOl1t<iminants into the ecosystem through spills and 

discharges may further increase mortality rates since they 

· may accumulat~' in' the Beaut'.lrt Sco:a polar bear population 

dl\.e to rh~ simplicity of area's tood web.'" Finany; oil 

industrial comple:xes may create opportunistic. feeding sites 

· r,cs~lliing in fatal human-bear conflicts and long term 
adaptive changes."," Under the terms llf the treaty, these risks 
'wigh in f:1Vor of protecting the Beaufort Sea polat' bear 
habitat in ANWR. If Congress nonetheless permits 
dnelopment of ulis habitat area, it could be violative of the 
treaty. 
3. 	 Int-ernational agreements on the protection .afmigratory· 
birds. . . 
The U,S, also entered iHto rreaties with Japan (1974)"' and 
. the U ,S.S.R. (1978 )"1 to protect migratory birds and their 
· habitat, many of ,,,hich arc fowld allnually in ANWR, Of 
the 189 species protected by Ule 'u .S. -Japan treaty, fifty-five 
· spedes arc knOW!l to visit the arctic coastal plain. Of these 
tlfty-five species, thirty-one are classified as "frequent" or ' 
"common l~igrants" to the. coastal plain, including the snow 
goose ."" 135 species of birds are known to rely on ANVYR 
filr habitat, including the 1002 Area.HI Thercfore, 40% of 
· these birds arc protected by the agreement.".' Of the species 
protected by the . U .5,-U.S,S.R. treaty, eighty-eight rely on 
ANWR for habitat, with thirty-three migrating, breeding, or 
. feeding 'in the area on a frequent basis, including the snow 
goose ! " USFWS reports "oil development in the Arctic 
Refuge would result in habitat loss, disturbance, and 
displacemcnt or abandonment'of ilhportant nesting, feeding, . 
molting and staging areas" for bird populations, particularly 
the snow goose ."7 Oil 'deyelopment in ANWR UlUS irilP.licates 
U.S. obligatiol1!S under both treaties . 
4. 	 Dtity to AssessEnvirom;zental Impacts 
The location ofAJ'..vVR along the U.S. -Canada border alid 
the implication offour international treaties creates a 
transboundary context tor the issue of development in the 
area, Tht' U .S. may therefore be obligated under 
international "law to ~bide by the principlC of duty 'to assess' 
environmental impacts. The duty to conduct. an . 
Environniental Impact Assessn1t'nt (ElA) fIX activities 
conducted in a transbo).lndal'Y context "is probably n~w a 
requirement of customary law, as 'it has heen recognized in 
numerous treaties and al1illcrcasing number of States arc 
R .} J ..... . ) ', A L A . J C 0 Iv! D A P A T V E ::: 1\1 v I '1 () r~ ~/l :. r J T A L . L A '/'i 
assessing transboundary impacts as part of their EIA . interest, it would be imprudent for Congress to 'pass 
regime, ,, ~ . The general purpose of an EIA is to fulty identil)' legislation such as Sen. M.urkowski's National Security 
and considp' the environmental impacts ofan activity bd()re Energy Act of 2000 that tra"nsfers. hind management 
it is undertaken, and to provide relevant actors the authority to the state. 
opportunity to understand thc potential impacts and express In confronting the question of the ·~ctic National Wildlife 
their views. The duty to pcrform !l1'1 EIA iii reflected, for Refuge, Congress has the ll11ique opportunity to preserve 
example, in Principle 4 of UNEP's Principles on Shared . one of the last .remaining pristine and intact ecosystems in 
Natural Resources (1978) and Articlc 14 of the Biodiversity the world. The ecosystem has been preserved to date .. under·. 
COlwention.'· Even if the proposed activity within the' the provision of ANILCA that desigliated the 1002 Area as a 
jurisdiction of a State does not ri* a trallsboundary impact, . special study area, The increasingly v()cal.and active sides of 
Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration suggests an EIA nJay still the dispute, however, will likely compel Congress to resolve . 
be l1l~ccssary if the activity has the potential to significantly the issue .. If a resoi"ution is derived from U.S. national law, . 
impact the local or regionaJ envirollment.YO • . Congress has two options: it can either authorize oil 
. 	 . 
exploration and development, or grant wilderness 
The U .S. did not. meet its duty under international law to designation. The marginal benefits of oil development are 
conduct an EIA through the LEIS submitted 'to'Congress in outweighed by its potential to advl~rsely impact an important 
1987. USFWS now regards the LEIS as insufficient since it ecosystein that supports tne native Gwich'in Indians and 
"adapted a highly compartmentalized asse~s'ment, and prot.ected species such as the Porcupine Caribou Herd, Polar 
considered impacts to species in isolation rather than as Bears, and migratory birds . 
. interconnected components of a 'coniplex ecosystem. "91 The The international environme.ntal law principle of common 
LEIS also concluded that the niajor impacts it predicted concern of humankind (CCH) also provides guidance on an 
were acceptable risks in reliance on mitigative measures, but appropriate regulatory scheme for Ar--f\VR. In contrast to 
some of its conclusions are "!;peculative and unproven. "92 the principle of common heritage of humankind that applies 
Since the J987 LEIS, environmental impacts have been to resources in the global commons, the principle of CCH 
observed in connection with the North Slope oil fields, yet concerns resources that are wirhin a particular State. The 
with reSpect to the' 1002 Area, "basdine stl1di~s a~e principle states that certain activities Jnd resources can no 
notoriously lacking, a study of cumulative impacts does not longer be viewed as falling solely within the domestic 
exist, and 'no eomprehensivc lEnvironrilental Impact . jLlrisdiction of J Statl\ but must be viewed as having 
Statement] has ever been undertaken.""" USFWS recognizes consequences.or imp0rtance with respect to humanity's 
the requir~~ment of "a more scientitlcally s()lll1d evaluation collective interest in the gl9b;,l1 environment. The principle 
[that considersJ the interrelationship of the specie.s a.nd the is rdkcted in the Biodiversity Convention, the Climate 
s~lrrounding environment ·of the coastal plain. "9! .If Congress Change Convention, and Article 3 of the International ' 
Juthorizes oil development in thl~ absence of an EIA, the Union for the Coriservatioll of Nature (IVCN ). Article 3 of 
U.S. would be negligible under international law, particularly the I UCN, f()r example, states the "global envirOliment is a 
in light of evidence that deve!op'mellt may adversely impact . common concern of 11llinanity." According to the 
PCH, polar bears, and migratory birds, as well as the arctic . commentary of Article 3, the principle is based "on the 
environment in general. scientifIC reality that harm to the environment resulting from 
human activities adversely afTect all humanity." It "implies 
Conclusion · 	 acceptance of both the right and the duty of the · . 
international community as J whole to have concern for the 
global environmelit." The principle of CCH thus ' :A laska may no longer be the last tj'ontier its legend' 
 necessitates international cooperation; 
. purports, but it' does r~main this nation's last 
International law, rather than U.S. national law, may best, opportluiity ti> oversee the early stJges of a state's 

effectuate a policy~that recognizes ANVVR~s global
dcvelopment and preserve its ecosystems."; If the state 

importance allu the common concerns of the Porcupine 
pursues a course ofsllstainable development to preser\'e its 
Caribou Herd, polar bears, and mig~tory birds. In addition natural resollrcesfor present and future. generations, it must ' 
to local and national interests, the principle of CCH compelsstrike a balance between industry and thc environment. The 

Congress to weigh the interests of the international . . 
influence of the oil industry on the state lcgislative and 

community, including Canada that Slipports pe.rmal1l~nt
exectltive branches, however, may preclode the ability of 

protection of the 1002Area from oil development. 
these branches to strike· the required balance .. The 

impartiality of the state's courts could therefore be . Canada's proposal to establish .an International Wilderness. 

Park (IWP) is consistent with the principle of CCH. An
instrumental in moniwring environmental disputes . 
I\VP would merge tc)gether the Vunnut and Ivvatik National Moreover, if tile federal government is to protel;t the . 

Parks in Canada and the Arnic National Wildlife Refuge, 
resources this nation regards as its national treasures, bur 

including the I002 Area .% An I\VP would "encourage 
that lie within Alaska's borders, it must retain the jurisdiction 

cooperation arid coordination in the conservation and 
it prese;ltly exercises. In light of the state's cnviroJ1n1ent~1 

management of transboundary wildlite, as well as the
contlict and a political process tilted in favor of the oil 
est'.lblishment of equivalent elwironmcntal p 'otection for the . 
whole region. '''17 'The IWP proposal i ~ precedented by The' 
St. Eli~lS Mountain World Heritage Site (comprised of the 
KJuane National Park and Tatshenshini -Alsek Wi lderness . 
Park in Cana~a and Wrangd-St'. rJias l\:ational Park an 
Reserve and: Glacier Ray NatIonal Park in the U.S. ) and the 
Watert<!n-Glacier International Peace Park (c0mprised of the 
Waterton Lakes ~ational Park in Canada and the Glacier 
National. Parkin the U .S.). Both of tlwse park sVStcl11S arc 
World Heritage Sites under I he authOrity of the Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the vVorid Cullural and 
Natural Heritage, ratified by the U.S. on July li,1973 . . ,' 
. Under the ConveIltion, "natural heritage" includes an area 
that 'HlI1stitutesthe hah itat of threareI1l:d species of aninuls 
and plants, and i ' of outstand ing llnivers;l l value from th <:­
point of \'iew of science, conservatjon and natural beauty. 
The Arqic National Wildlife Rdllge, including the 1002 
Area, is such aH area . . From the perspecti\'e of the treaty ,ll1d 
in light of the magnitude and gravity of the dangtr from oil 
exploration and development th,i.t threa.tens the area, it is . 
incuinbent on the internatiQIUI COI11 Illllllity' as a \~'hole to 
participate in its protection. 
* T1'ItStees f'o)' Alaska offen paid JlHmJlCr legal i1ttel;~ships. For 
more i1Zfor1Jlation, cOl1tact Trwtecs fin- Alaska at 1026 W 4th 
AI'c.,Suitc 2UI, AlIciJm,a.Hc, AK, 99501,01' by phone at (907) 
276-4244. For illfo1'matioll ()lIlinc. l'iJit lJlll'lV.tl·lIstce.UJ1~q. 
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Introduction to the Kyoto 
Mechanisms 
O ne of the Kyoto Protocol's most significant features is the 
incorporation of market-based 
mechanisms desigJ-led to allow Annex B 
countries to·achieve their required 
emission. reductions at a .cost-effecu·ve 
level. No international.environmental 
agreement to date has relied on flexible 
market me<;:hanisms to the extent called 
fc)r in the Protocol. The Protocol 
contains three such "Kvoto"" 
mechanisms: joint implementation Oi, 
Article 6), the Clean Development 
Mechan.ism (CDM, Article 12), and 
international emissions trading (lET, 
Ai-ticle 17)." The comnion feature ·of 
these mechanisms is that they allow 
Parties to the ProtQcol to transfer . 
greenhuuse gas (GHG) emissions 
credits or units among themselves. 
None of the Kyoto me~han;sms arc 
fully defined in the Protocol, arid they 
all ~vill n::quire significant additional 
·c1arificatlon by the Parties before they 
can be used. Nevertheless, it is a~p;:lft-nt 
that how ·these mechanisms arc 
elaborated will intluence both the 
implementation of,and compliance 
with, the obligations of the Protocol. 
Article 4: Joint Fulfilhnent 
Joint Fulfillment OF) allows 
. . 	Parties with emissions 
rcduction commitments to 
jointly meet those · 
commitments by entering into 
al} agreement that redistributes 
~he total reductions among the 
parties to the agret-mt-nt_ Once 
the agreement is finalized and 
deposited with the secretariat, 
the revised emission reduction 
targets t()r each participating 
Party be 'omes enfOrceable 
under the Protocol. This 
·provision was originally 
introduced to allow regional 
economic integration 
organizations· (such as the 
European Union) to make 
alternative distributions of the 
Protocol's repuctions 
requirements amongst their 
members_ During the, course of 
negotiati<)I1s, the provisi()n was 
. expanded to allow any group 
of Annex I Parties to enter into 
such an agreement: 
Article 6:Joint 

Impleme'ntRtio1! 

Joint Implementation (1) 
allows for Annex. BI Partic.s'· to 
transter to o~ acquire from 
other Annex I Parties emissions 
reduction units (ERUs) 
. associated with 
spcciticproduced trom projects 
that reduce GHG emissions or 
enhan·ce removals from· "sinks" 
in 'other Annex I countries 
designed to redl,ce emissions 
or enbance sinks of GHGs; 
Thus one a 
Party (or its authorized legal 
entities wjthin its 
jurisdiction)c.ntity may sponsor 
or· finance a GHG reduction 
project in another Party's 
territOl'Y in ·exchange for some 
or all of the GHG reductions 
resulting from the project. 
Under Article 6 such 
arrangements must be 
approved by ·both Parties 
involved, mllst provide climate 
··bendits . beyond those that 
would othenyise occur, n1ust 
be supplemental to domestic 
a'ctiort in the acquiring Party, 
and are prohibited if the 
acquiring Party is not in 
compliance with ·its accounting 
and r~porting obligations . 
under the Protocol. A transfer 
of\Vhen a Party transfers 
ERUs, it subtracts them from 
its is a subtraction from a 
Party's assigried amount." , 
while a purchase of When a 
Party acquires them, ERUs is 
an additiorl to a l'arty'sit adds 
them to its assigned '!mount 
(Kyoto Protocol, Articles 3.10 
-and 3,11). 
Article 12: CleRn Development 
MechR1,ism 
The Clean Development 
Mechanism (COM) is designed 
intended to promote 
sustainable development in 
developing (non-Annex I) 
countries (i.e., developing 
countries) and assist Annex I 
countries to meet their 
emissions reduction 
requirements by creating a 
·mechanism forproviding Annex 
I countries ,vith the 
·opportunity to spOhsor or 
t1nance GHG reduction 
projects in non-Annex I . 
countries. Article 12 requires 
that emissions reductions must 
provide "reaJ, measurable, and 
long-term benefits related to 
the mitigation of climate 
change" and provide benefits 
additional to those that would 
occur in the absence of the 
project, Emissions 
rReductions from CDM 
projects will he subject to a 
. certitlcatiori. procedun: that 
Climate Change Links 
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http·(/vww gr!Nf\1I1ClPoJrtliSQ:;I'3tv. (g 
( lOt 11 Enyir(lrllT1er l{al Fw lilly 
r rtp:l/athena.r.see.urntx8<Ju:9cm/EUSIresullrcc. -jwww.ga~N(>.b.org C ate Ac ll n Network 
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remains to be elaborated by 
. the Parties.' Nev rtheless, . 
Article .12 requires that 
'emissions reductions must 
provide "real, measurable, and 
IOllg-terill benefits related to · 
tht; .mitigation ()f climate 
change" and provide bendits 
additional to those that would 
oceur in the abst.'nce of the 
project. Annex I countries will 
be able to use certitied 
enlissions r.cduction units 
(CERs) to help illect their 
reduction targets under "the 
Protocol. Legal entities may 
participate in CDM projects. 
Article 17: Em;ssio1JS 
Tra'ding 
Articl~ 17 3110\vs for the 
elaboratiOJl ot' a systeril of 
intern,ational emissions 
trading (lET) between 
Al1I1cX I Partics. Under a ' 
trading system, Parties 
(and potentially legal 
entities) would bc able to 
.buy and sell the right to 
emit GHGs. This would 
eftcctivcly transf,:r 
e'missions from one 
couritrv to, another 
allowing tbe Partie~ to seek 
out the least-cost 
f reductions. Thus a Party 
could oftset its domestic 
l'l11i'ssions by purchasing 
e'missions reductions from 
another Party if the cost of 
domestic reduction exceeds 
the cost of equivalent 
reductions in·the other 
country Both parties to a [J:ad1: . 
wou.1d adjust their domestic 
, G H G 'calculations to retlectthe 
trade: reslIlting in lower net 
emissions in the selling country 
and higher in the buyer 
coup try. The mechanics, and 
parameters of the trading 
system require fi.lrthcr 
elaboration by the P~rties .. 
.liabilitY under the Kyoto, · rules that set out which ParrY' to the 
transfer is resp~nsible tor taking action Mechanisms 
or foregoing use of tr:1I1stcrred amounts 
· to rectil)' the problem. Thus theJuint Implementatjon and the Clean . 
respcmsibility in question is ' i)evdopmen~ Mechanisms are projCl:t­
responsibility tor exceeding assigned based mechanisms in which 
amounts in the case of Article 17 lET
monitoring, vcrificationaild 
and Article 4 J1-=, and responsibility t(lr 
certitication will, presumably, establish 
shortcomings of green house gas 
, th.at the , credits transterred represent 
· Hybrid Liability C01ltillltcd genuine redu~tions . Theretore, this 

article \vill focLls on emissions trading 
 (GHG ) projects il1'the context of
under Article 17 qf the ' ProtocoLThis 
Articlc 6 JI and the Article 12 CDM .jrticle is concerned with the isslleof 

\vhich Party to a trade bears 

The preseIH,"C of CI Kyoto Mechanisms .
responsibility for ensuring that the 
mechanisms will to some extent 
complicate the question of whethel: 
" a country is adequately' .. 
. implementing, its emission 
The CIEL Climate Change PrQgram reduction obligations . The 
emissions accounting rules \vill , 
The Climate Change Program at the Center for 
'doubtless operate on some 
International Environmental Law (CIEL) strives retinemcnt of the t()Uo\ving 
to protect' the Earth's climate system while tormula: total emissions equals 
simultaneously promoting other environmental domestic emissions minus total 
. and social concems, such as rorest redUctions bought plus t(lul 
conservation, biodiversity protection, and reductions sold . 
human rights. CIEL has played an integral role 
adVising major players in the,international Harmoniz~d accounting I:ules will 
policy arena how to work towards a need to be developed so that all 
sustainable, enforceable emissions reduction parties to the Protocol pursue the 
framework. They have attended every session same apprl)acl.l to measuring 
of the Conference of the Parties since the implcmentati(jn and compliance. 
United Nations Framework Convention for \Vhi/e they may complicate the ' 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) entered into force. implementation/ compliance 
CIEL has been intimately involved in the , picture on the one hand, 011 the 
negotiations surrounding the Kyoto Protocol, other hand Kyoto Mechanisms CI 
which for the first time establishes binding, could serve as <). powerful 
numerical emissions reduction targets for implementation tool. For 
industrialized countries. For more information 
, example, CI the mcch~nisms 
visit http://wWw.cie/.arg/ccp.htm/ might be used prospectively to 
enc(mragc Parties to comply with 
national reporting and in!)titution , 
· building, obligatilins. U nefer thistrade docs 'not result 'in contributing to 
approach, only once partics 'have 
non-compliance by the transferring 
established reliable il1\~entory and
, Party. Whi-Ie' each Party to the Protocol 
reporting prpcedures would they be bears the ti.lI1damelltal burden of 
allowed to join the group of tradingtaithfi.i1ly executing its obligatioils 
partners.
under the agreement, the introduction 
of CI eftcctlvelyemissions trading 
In addition, the trading regime raises allows' Parties to transfer a portion of 
the possibility of suspending. trading their assigned amounts to other Parties. 
privileges in response to a [,ilun" toWhen such transters result in the 
- implement substantive emissions inability of a Party to (Tieet its own 
reduction obligations under theobligations, ho\v such 'obligation: 
busting, trailsfers are treated requires 
P"g e 1 2 IN T· R.NAT ONA AN) CO M PAR A T IV C NVI R ONM f N T A L. LAW 
(which may be' assigned on a bi-latcral ' 
or contractual basis). Partic;; to trades 
can redistribute the financial 
consequences of the responsibility rules 
through contractual arrange~nent, but 
respoi1sibility under the rules of the 
. Protocol cannot be redistributed. 
Protocol. Moreover, the inclusion ofeI 
these mechanisms in the Protocol is 
likely to help form the political 
conS('nSliS necessary to build robust 
implcincntation and non-compliancc 
procedures. Without such procedures, 
there would be no guarantee.of the 
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validity of traded units and few 
countries would want to be involved in The '"liability" rule for Article ' 17 
'trade); wht:re the valuc of traded units is emissions trading will address the 
uncertain. Naturally, Parties" interest in qu.estion of whether countries that 
benefiting from CI will increase their · participate' in trading can redeem 
willingness to comply with the roles for assigned amount units originating fi·om 
trading themselves. Parties that exceed their targets at the 
end of the commitment ,period. Thl" . 
Distinct 'from the question of which rule remains amO:ng the most 
Party bears responsibility (which is contentious unresolved issues standing 
decided by the rules implementing the in the way of t1nal agrc<;ment 011 this 
'Protocol ) is the issue of assigning risk key Kyoto mechanism. 
We believe that a hybrid liability rule 
based upon a commitment NriOli reserve 
would ensure envirorimcntal integrity ' 

. and liquidity of the trading system, and 

would provide a point of convergence 

for. negotiators. Under our proposal : 

Parties wishing to trade must establish a . 
commitment period reserve of assigned 
amount units (MUs). 
The reserve' is created by projeqting a 
five-year emissions trajeCtory based 
upon prior emissions inventories. 
The trajectory is adjusted each year to 
reflect the Party's annual emissions 
inventory and expert review of the 
previous year's inventory. 
. A Party's net assigned amount 
(adjusted for aCCllJisitions and transfers) 
that is surplus to the reserve may be 
transferred under issuer, or seller, 
liability. 
Assigned amount that is part of the 
reserve (i.e., not surplus) may be 
transferred under user, or buyer, liability. 
Some advocates of seller liability have 
argued that a rule utilizing buyer liability 
in whole or part would be unworkable 
because it could trigger a-cascading 
"domino effect" of non-compliance. The 
effect would make it impossible for 
potential traders to evaluate the risk of 
.pufch'ases and. impossible for Parties to . 
determine ' whether their legal entities 
holding buyer liability MUs were in 
compliance with their' domestic 
obligations (which in turn would make it 
impossible for a Party to true-up). Under 
our proposal, the risk of a puyer liability­
induced "domino effect" is eliminated by 
restricting the' invalIdation of buyer 
liability" MUs to those originating from 
Parties whose verified emissions for the 
commitment period exceed their gross 
adjusted assigned aroount. 
Gross assigned amount includes all of
. . 
the buyer and seller liability MUs held 
by a Party at the end of the true-up. 
After the ti,ue-up . andexpe,.f review; a 
Party whose emissions exceed its gross 
adjusted assigned amount is subject to 
a finding of non-compliance. 
Buyer liability MUs origina'ting from the 
non-compliant· Party are temporarily 
invalidated on a last-in, first-out basis, 
and may not be used by any Party for 
compliance purposes until ttJe 
originating Party remedies its excess 
emissions and returns to compliance. 
Parties holdll?g temporarily invalidated 
MUs will face a compliance 
proceeding if," after the invalidation; 
their net emissions exceed their· 
adjusted assjgned amount and th~y dl? 
not acquire sufficient "good" MUs to 
make up the shortfall. 
However, so long as a Party's 
emissions do not exceed its gross 
assigned amount-Jf?cludir?g all MUs it 
holds at the end of the true-up, . 
. whether they have been invalidated or 

not-then any buyer liability MUs 

. originating from it will remain valid and 
may be used by other Parties andlor 
private entities for their own 
compliance· purposes. 
Buyer vs. Seller Liability 
M uch of the liabilitv debate has f<JCused on the two extremes of 
pure seller and pure buyer liability. . . 
· Under pure seller liability, a Party that 
acquiresAAUs through en:lissiom 
trading' c'an lise them rcg:lrdless how 
the P:lrty from whom they originated 
· ultimately perforols. Advocates of pure 
· seller liahility argue that a strong 
compliance system 
~vill preverit Parties from "overstlliilg," 
because ifthev do transter to<> much 
assigned amo~l11t, they will be sllbject 
to sa;1Ctionsl:lilder the Protocol's 
compliance system. These advocates 
generally believe that a seller liability 
rule will be the easiest to administer 
and -will best encourage trades. to go 
forw-:lrd so that the system flourishes. 
Proponents of pure buyer liability 
~espond that seller liability will 
encourage risky sales, hecause the buyer 
will have no incentive to seek _AAUs 
o'om-Parties' \~!ho have the best chance 
of ineeting their targets. The-~r il0te two 
critical problems with sener liability 
svstems. First, there is little assurance. 
tiut the compliance system will be 
strong ~nough to deter overselli!lg or 
adequately remedy excess emissions 
caused by overselling (especially if the 
overselling is due to poor management 
or planning-, and not to "willtlll" 
behavior). Second, the largesi: "seller" ­
countries may not have the technical, 
n:gulatory, and political, ability to 
safeguard the integrity of their sales, 
nor the ability to remedy any emissions 
·e!'(cess alter it oc-curs. 
Under pure buyer liability, some or all 
of the AAUs that originated fron'l a 
. Part'\' that exceeds its assigned amount 
are jiscoumcd or invalidated. The · 
dis.cOlUlted or inv"lid-.1ted AAUs could 
be retllflled ro the seller to assist its· 
own conipliance, banked by the 
acquiring Party tel\" its use when and if 
the issller re;:stores itself to compliance, 
·or simply retired. Either way, the 

· acquiring Party is not able to use the 

AAUs to meet -its targer tor the 

. commitment period trom which they 

originated. 

Generally, we-agree that purl" buyer 
liability is preferahle to pure seller 
li·ability. Under s.eller liability, only oqe 
party to the transaction .. the sdler.. need 
transaction-the s'elkra'need be 
concerned about the seller's 
compliance. The buyer has nb reason 
to worry, because it will be able to use 
the tons it purchases regardless of the 
seller's performance. Under buyer 
liability, both parties care. The buyer 
cares because it may not be able to use 
some of the tons it purchased if the 
seller goes out of compliance. The 
sdler Cares b-ecause it can get a better 
price tor its tons if it can assure the 
buyer that it is willing and able to 
·comply. 
A BeHer Idea: Hybrid Liability 
. we belil:ve h1'brid liability is 
. -preferable 'to either pu~e buyer Or 
pure-seller liability, because of the 
additional benefits it creates. These . 
benefits include: 
Enhanced complianCt', 
Addedflcxibi~ity, 
G,'catc/' tl'l11tsplll'enc)'. 
- EnbarlCedcompliance 
Hybrid schemes require th;:Jt 
the seller's perfbrmance be 
tracked during the 
. commitr11t:nt period. That 
pcrfi.ml1ance will det.ermine, in 
part, whether a Party call sdl 
tons under seller liability 
(enabling it to get the highest · 
. : price for its tons) or buyer 

liability (in which case it may 

- nOt be able t(l sell at all). 'Thus, 
PJ,rtics that \"ish to sell have a 
strong financial incentive to 
cnmply with their obligations 
by staying-within the systeni 
parameters. (i.e., by not 
overselling or over-emitting). 
Addedfle:~ibility 
Under hybrid schemes, buyer 
liabilitv AAUs and seller 
liabilit}, AAUs will be present · 
iil the nlarkrt at the same time_ 
Thus, purchasers have greater 
flexibility in designing their 
"porti(llio" of AAUs. For 
example, buyers may seek to _ 
purchase eriough seller liability 
AAUs to cover their expected 
excess emission-s during the 
commitment period. In 
addition, they may choose to 
purchase 59me buyer liability 
AAUs as 'a cost-effective hedge 
~lgaillst unfi.-)j·esecn emissions or 
to bank for subsequent . 
commitment periods_ 
Greater trll-nspare1lcy 
Transparency is the essential 
ingredient of hybrid schemes. 
Buyers, regulators; an'd the 
public should have access on a 
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daily basIs to information 
about trades. All information 
about trades should be 
recorded as thlOy .occur in a 
publicly available registry o~ an 
internet web' site. That way, 
anyone with a computer will be . 
able to see at a glance whether 
Parties are on track to meeting 
their commitments or veering 
off course. 
.The "Traffic Light" Approach 
T
wo years ago CIEL proposed a . 
"traffic light" J.iability system. This 
hybrid approach would allow all Annex 
B Parties to trade initially on a seller 
liability (i .e., "gre~n light") basis. The 
combined rate of emis~i()ns and sales 
during the commitment period would 
be tracked "tC;r each Party. If at any time' 
during the commitment period a Party 
exceeded its planned trajec~ory, a 
"yeliow light." would be triggered and. 
the Party could continue to sell only on 
a buyer liability basis . . 
It soon became apparent that this 

svstem had an inherent tlaw: During 

d1e time. it would tak~ for Parties tei 

. submit emissions inventories (about a 
y~,ar), and perhaps have them reviewed 
by expert teams (anotlH.T year), much 
damage could be done. A Party could 
vastly ov.er-sell before the .system . 
caught me problem and triggered the 
yellow light. 
Moreover, as noted earlier, some · 
. commentatorS objected that the 
pres~nce . of a buyer liJbility .componc~t 
could stitle potential trading because It 
could lead to a \Cascading, "domino 
effect" of non-compliance . They 
argued that this possibility would' make 
it impossible for potential traders to 
evaluate the risk of purchasing huyer . 
Iiabili~' AAUs and impossible for. . 
Parties to determine whether their legal 
entities holding such AAUs were i'n 
compliance with their domestil= 
obligations (which in turn would make 
it impossible f(ir a Party to true-up at 
the end of the commitim.'J1t period). 
INTE'RNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL cAW 
Our Proposal: A Commitment. 	 assigned amount as they buy and sell 
through the Kyoto mechanislJTS·. Thus, Period Reserve with a limited 
these Parties may transfer on a seller Buyer Liability Component liabilitv basis as iong as their emissions ' 
are below their net assigned amount,Our proposal ad~res~es the "time which would equal their initial assigned lag" and "dom1l10 problems by 
amount adjusted to retlect transfers and . ( 1) establishing a reserve of assigned 
acquisitions of ERUs, CERs, and . 
amount units pr.ior to the start of the AAUs).
commitment period and (2) limiting 

the potential inyaliqation of buyer 
 It is important that the reserVe be. setliability transfers to transfers from 
· to match a Party's actual emissions Parties whose verified emissions exceed projections, ami not some arbitrarily their gross adjusted assigned amount. discounted number. Each Annex B . 
Party's core obligation under the Commitment period reserve 
. Pror'ocolis to en~un: that its aggregate The commitment period reserve is 
emissions for th~ commitment period 
created by projecting a tlvl=-year do not exceed its assigned amount. The
emissions trajectory fiJr the incentive structure incorporated within 
commitment period fiJr each Party, 
the liability rule should be geared based on its inventories submitted 
towards hllfillment of that core before the start of the commitment 
oblig,Hion. The rule should stinlulate . period. The projected eil1issions are 
.. businesses to lobby their governments held in reserve. If the pmjettcd for dfective, comprehensive national 
emissions are less than the Party's 
strategies for luwering overall emissions 
assigned amount, the difference 
as early as possible, so that tht~ c04ntry . between the two is considered sUJ:pl.us. 
as a whole will have surplus assigned 
amount. It should help motivate Parties The emissions trajectory and reserve 
to lower thdr actual emissions by
arc revised annually on tile basis of the 
rewarding them with the ability to sell
new inventory and an expert review of 
tI'le resulting surplus assigned amountthe pre,;ious year's inventory.. If a . 
at the highest mar~et price. That can be Par tv's emissions are lower than . 
accomplished by giving Parties that. exp~cted, the surplus 'is increased. If . hold surplus assigned amount the. nght
.thev are higher than expected, the to transfer their surplus under seller su~plus is reduced. . liability. Any rule that permits Parties to 
transfer their non,surplus assigne.d .Each vear during the commitment , 
amount under seller liability will f.'1il toperiod, the PJ'rty cal1 sell In' . 
take advantage of this important
"annualized" portion of its surplus ~m a cO~lpltance incentive.
sdler liability basis. In other words, 

during the first year .of the period, it 

·Transfers fro." reserve subject 
can sell up tn one-fifth of its surplus to limited buyer liability 
under selkr liability~ During the second 
year, it can sell up to one-tourth ~(the • Even allowing for acquisitions of
remaining, .adjusted surplus. punng the 
assigned amo.unt through the Kyoto 
third year, one-third, etc. Of course, 
mechanisms, some based Hn their prior inventories and Parties rna\' not be able to maintain a initial assigned amount (as determined 
net surplu~a:lld thus will not be eligible bv Annex Band Artick 3.7), SOIT\e 
· to transter AAUs under seller liability. P~rtks migh't not have any surplus, . These Parties may nonetheless believe it because their projected emissions 
wiII be advantageous tor t1lt:ir dori1esti~(which equal their commitment period businesses to have the freedom to sell
reserve) would always be higher than AAUs on the international market ..their i'nitial assigned amount. However, . They may additionally fear that the .Artick'S 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 allow 
opportunity for such businesses to sell
. Parties to add to or'Subtract from their 
under buyer liability will be an empty ' 
one, because the)i may believe 110 one 
,viii be interested in such p'urchases so· . 
·Iong JS they could be sllbject to an 
unpredictable, seemingly I?ndless 
"d()mino effect" triggered whe.n an 
issuingyJrty f:lils ro comply wIth its 
commitment period target. 
Under our proposal, if such a Party (or 
sll~h JParty~s legal entities) wisht's to 
scli non-s~lrpllls t OIls, .it may sell them 
frOlil the Part)"s commitment peri()o 
reserve on a limited bUYfl·liability.basis. 
This buyer liability component lowers 
.	the risk thJt non-sllrplus transfers from 
the r sen'c could 'ultimately lead rothe 
merall Annex B tJrget being exceeded. 
In particular, it 'nhaiKes the prospect 
of compliance by giving potential ' . 
purchasers an illcenri\'(: ~o e\'aluate the 
"credit worthiness~' of the issuing. 
countr) bdon: the)' buv. At the saIne 
time, the limited aspect of this buyer 
liability component eliminates the 
possibility of a "domino effect" of non­
compliance and invalidation of buyer 
liabllity MUs, which in turn eliminates 
the main concern that s()mc Partics and 
businesses haw expressed abOl/t ·buyer 
liabilit\'. 
Aft r the end of the commitment 
period .. . period when Annex B Parties 
have submitted their tlnal inventories, 
be(~n reviewed by expert rc'View teams' 
(ERE) pursuant (0 Artick 8, and Iud 
an opportunity to true-up their excess 
emis~ions by aCL]uiri.ng additional tons . 
. via the kyoto 1)1.:chanisl11s-any Pjrry . 
whllsenet emissions stilI'cxceed its 
adjusted assigned amount \ViII bl.: 
sUbjc.ct to a compliance proceeding. 
.under "traditional" buyer Iiabiht)' 
schemes, if that Party is tl1ulld to be in 
non-compliance, the MUs it 
transferred under buyer liability are 
invalidated o~ n:..::alkd in an amount 
equal to its excess emissions. Any Part)' 
holding thosl' invalidated or r~calIed 
M Cs Illay then not h,lVe enough ­
assigned amount to ca'i'er its own 
emissions, and will consequently face its 
own finding of non-compliance. 
That finding would result in the 
invalidation or recall of AAUs it had 
transferred under buyer liability, which 
could in turn trigger a cascade of non ­
compliancc few en:n more Parties .. 
. U ncler our proposal, .any invalidation of 
buyer liability MUs would be limited 
to the first "tranche" afnon-complying 
Partie~. In otlWr words; il~validation 
would aJ)ply only'to buyer li~bility 
AA Us originating from ·thpse Parties 
whose; aggregate emissi(lI1s ex~eed their 
gross adjusted assigned amount-where 
gross assigned amount includes all of 
the Im_V/T aid Jeller liability AA Us hdd 
b.v a Pm'~l' at the end of the tr·ue -up. 
"Invalidation" would be cl)llducted in 
, the sam-e way proposed b)' the· 
European Union in.· i.ts "mixed liabilit),,, 
prqposal (included as Option 5 in the 
cUrl'ent Mechanisms. tl:xt). MUs 
(lrigillating from a non-complying 
Parq' would remain in the registry ·of 
the acquirillg Part)i and would ilOt be 
. :returned to the; issuer. Th'c acqu.iring 
. Party could retain and bank the 
invalidated AAUs pursuant to Art. . 
3: 13, but could not use them for 

complianl:'e purposes until the issuer 

remedied its ex(ess emi.ssions and 

returned to compliance . 

Limited buyer liability pre.cludes .the 
possibility of an unpredictable "domino 
effect" of non-compliance . A Part)' 
holding il\\'alidated AAUs wilI.still tace 
compliance proceeding if~ after the 
ilH'alidatidi1, its aggregate emissions 
exceed its adjusted assigned aJ.1lOunt 
and it docs not acquire sufticienr 
"good" AAUs to make up the ·shorthll. 
However, so long as a Party's emissions 
do not exceed its g1'oSS assigned 
amount"":- including all AAUs it holqs 
at th~ end of the true-up, wlw'ther they 
have ·beeJ.1 invalidated or not- thl:n any. 
buyer liabilit), MUs origillating' ti-onl it 
\;'·ill· remain \'alid and niay be used by 
~ther .Partiesan~Vor private entities filr 
their o\vn corilpliance purposes. 
Limited buyer liability allows each Party 
to evaluate the compliance . of irs legal 
entities witluheir domestic obligation:; 
within a firiite time. Upon learning that 
sOlne of the AAUs it held had b~cn . 
ilwalidated dUt' tl) the issuer's non ­
compliance, the holding Part)' would · 
noti~' its legal entities who had 
te'ndereti the AAUs. The entities colild 
Pllg e 15 
be given a brief t!me to either tender 
replacement AAUs orpay a significant 
tine. 
Anv·uncntainty on the part of those 
entities and their Iwine governments as 
to whether or not the buyer liabilit)' 
MUs they had pun;hased were good 
would be resolved upon the 
determination of whether the issuing 
country's g l 'OJJ assigned ·amount was ·· 
sutrlcient to cover its cmissi'JIls . T he 
entities would have preSumably paid fj.lr 
the MUs b~sed IIp.on the "credit 
worthiness" ofthe issuing Party and, 
depending nn the perceived risk; would 
have made contingency arrangements 
(sllch as insurance, additional 
purchas{'s, ·or options contracts) l{) 
protect themselvcs against the risk. But 
since the riSK of im·jlidation will 
·depend only on .tlle performance of the 
"primary" issliing Party, and not upon 
the qualit)' of the buyer liability MUs 
th.e issuing Party (and/ or its entities). 
may be holding, entities will not tace 
the task of trying tli evaluatl: anl'ndless 
web of compounded risk. Accordingly, 
our proposal wil! alIo", buyer liability 
acquisiti(ms to go torward as a viable 
option for entities and Partie!>, ",hile 
. simultaneously providing the sensible 
safeguards anq .incentives that buyer 
liability can bring. 
Conclusion 
The new liybrid liability rule we 
propose, based upon a commitmellt 
period reserve, ~olvesthe problems that 
were identified with the traffic light 
approJch. Because trades can 'be 
-registered in real time and madc public 
on the interm~t; a "yellow light" trigger 
could operate virtually instantaneously. 
.If a Party oVl'rsells wjthout making. 
sufticient upward adjustrncnts to its 
assigned amount, it will· immediately 
trigger J "yellow light" so that the sale 
is subject to .buyer liability. 
The new rule preser\'~:s the vil~t.ues of 
the traffic light and other. hybrid 
systems. It enhances conipliance by 
tracking emissions during the 
comri.1itment period, adds flexibilit), by 
giving buyers an option of purchasing 

either seller or buyer liability 

allowances, and increases transparency 

by requiring that alI'trades be publicly 

registered as they occur. Finally, it 

provides liquidity to the market by . 

allowing buyer liapiHty transfers in a 

way that does not expose potential 

purchasers to unmanageable risk. 

Epilogue 
Contrary to the hopes and expectations, 
of nearly everyone concerned, 
negoti,ators at .the Sixth Conference of , 
, the Parties, held at The Hague in 
November 2000, were unable to agree 
on the rules that would make ' 
ratification and implementatiOl'i of the 
Protocol possible. This failure included ' 
the liability rules for emissions trading. 
, Some progress on liability was made, 
however, when negotiators appeared to 
agree that a commitmerlt perio.d reserve ' 
approoch would represent the best 
opportunity for convergence between 
pure buyer and seller liabillty. Such an , 
approach was included in the "Note by , 
the President of COP6" dis.1ributed by 
Jan Pronk to the COP during the 
second week of the conference:9 In 
that document, President Pronk 
proposed that Parties retain 70% of 
their assigned amount as a commitment 
period r,eserve. In other words, the 
reserve would not, be based upon real 
, or estimated emissions, but simply a 
portion of the assigne.d amount each 
Party held at the beginning of the 
commitment period. . ' 
A reserve of 70% would mean that 
every Annex B Party could transfer up 
to 30% of its assigl)ed amount under , 
seller liability, regardless what its actual 
emissions 'were . While such a reserve 
could prevent a "rogue state" from 
, selling all of its assigned a~ount and 
then quitting' the Protocol, it would do 
little or nothing to prevent the more 
'incremental overselling that probably 
represents the most likely risk. As such, 
in practical terms it would amount to a 
pure seller liability rule, which would 
be relatively easy to admini~er, but 
I NTI=RNAT I O NA I. AND C OMPARi\ -IV E 
would provide few incentives to 
, prospective buyers and sellers to 
improve their emissi~ns performance. 
When ministers representing the 

United States and European Union 

briefly believed they had arrived ,at an 

agreement during an all-night~ 

negotiating session on' the final night of 

the conference, they did not discuss the 

liability rule. After the short-lived; 

"agreement" collapsed on Saturday 

morning, EU squrces revealed that one 

of the things that led them to reject it 

,was a belief that it implicitly assumed 

that the Pronk proposal for a 70% 

reserve \vould be adopted. Although 

the U.S. 'and its "Umbrella Group" 

allies generally support the Pronk ' 

propos,!-I, the EU and most 

environmental groups have d~dared it 

to be unacceptable. 
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The In,ternatio:nalization of the 

Amazon 

By Manuel Nabais da Furrielal• 
As the world's largest tropical rain tor~~t, with a fifth of , , the globe's fresh water, the preservation of the , , Amazon is a major concern of the international 
com'munity. Such con~ern is heightened by the fact that it is 
also one of the largest carbon sinks, meaning that it helps to 
counter theefrects of greenhouse gases; and therefore serves 
as an invaluable asset tor curbing global warming. In 
addition, it contains a massive depository of biodiversity and 
, its own indigenous cultures. ' ' 
The Amazon encompasses over six and a half million square 
kilometers, spanning nine nations. I More than palf of its 
area lies within, Brazil, covering two thirds of Brazil's 
territory. Given the wealth of environmental benefits, , 
economic opportunities, and cultural differenq:s, it is no 
wonder that controversy surrounds the management of this , 
geographically fragmented area. Interest grQuPS, 
governments, and industries from around the world are 
locked in a debate over the sustainable development of the 
region. To date, this dialogue has failed to yield a consistent 
policy for managing this rich and diverse biome .. 
Importantly, thesc efforts have had the unintended 
consequence of alarming and alienating Brazil, which has 
responded to. tears of international encroa~hment by 
developing and militarizing the area. Within that context, 
, this article examines the complex interaction of two often' 
conflicting principles of international environmental law, at 
work in the Amaz.on debate: sovereignty and the common 
concern of humankind. 
Sovereignty vs. the Common Concern of 
, Human,klnd 
The sovereign right ora ,state to exercise' control' over its ' territory is a traditional, if not fundamental, principle of 
international law. This sovereignty e'xtends to the limits of a 
nation's geographic borders arid includes the sub-soil 
beneath and the airspace above it.2This right, however; is 
qualified, tc)r example, by a state's gencral duty not to harm 
the interests, including the environment, of another state.' 
Both the Stockholm' and Rio pcclarations5 st~te that the 
principle of sovereignty applies to the right of a state to 
devdpp its natural ·resources. Developing nations sought 
'this recognition as part of their pursuit of a new internatronal 
economic order (NIEO) that would give them more leverage 
' 
when dealing with de'Veloped couiltries; These "eHorts' to 

maintain control over their natural resources .. . contlict 

directly with the movement to liberalize trade and ' 

investment"6 ~d efforts to internationalize environmental 

protection. 

The S'tockholm Declaration7 recoghjzed that some 
environmental issues are of common concern to all 
huma.nkind." It notes that "[a] growing class of 
environmental 'problems, be.c4use they are regional or global 
in extent or because they affect,the common international 
, realm, will require extensive cooperation among nations and 
action by international organizations in the common 
inter~st.";' Subsequent international environmental treaties, 
including the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change lO and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, repeatedly have endorsed this concept of gJobal 
cooperation on environmental issues with international 
implications. II The Convention on Biological Diversity is 
particularly significant since it involves environmental 
pr~tection' ()f resources fou.nd within a nation's border. 12 , 
. The protection of the Amazon brings sovereignty and 
common concern of humankind clashing together. While 
the world may contend that coordinated action is needed to 
deal with the deforestation of the Amazon, difficulty exists in 
reconciling this idea with Brazil's right to exercise exclusive 
control over its territory. 
The Pressure to Internationalize the Amazon 
Th~ "Internationalization of the Amazon" is a col)cepi: developed in Brazil that reflects the fear among-Brazilians 
that .the international community will invade or otherwise 
' intertere directly with the Amazon. Since Brazil's 
independence, foreign 'companies, piedominantly U.S. and 
European, have exploited the nation's natural resources . In 
addition to this commercial assault, the Amazon is .often ' 
'cited as a global resource, that can assist with any number of 
international problems railging from the practical to the 
absurd. The latter occurred during the 1960s ,,;hen there 
was frequent 'talk of the Amazon as an evel~tual rcti.lge.in the 
event of nuclear war. While this may seem t()olish in­
retrospect, military organizations in some' foreign countries 
went so far as to finance -scientific research on this proposal 
during the cold war: The idea of the Amazon as a "tropical 
tallout shelter" t<Jr t\1e world represented the first steps 
toward its gradual internationalization. 
In the 1970s, the m<>vement reached full speed with the 
scientific discoveries of global w;mning and thc'importance 
of bi~diversi~y. Suddenly, the Amazon was ;ecn as the 
• 	·"luilgS of the e.lrth" and the globe's natural refuge tor 
biodiversity. Overnight, every Hollywood movie star became 
an expert on the lite-saving drugs that awaited discO\'ery in 
some remote jungk.. 
I n truth, no na'tion has ever suggested that the Amazon 
co'uld become the property of the international cCJl11Illunity. 
The i~tca itself is absurd since many other n...-gions or 
ecosystcins are of equal importance to the world's ecology. 
T.lke'thl~ case of the extensive temperate t()rests of northern 
Europe, Asia,. and America, t()f example, wb.i<;h sequester as 
Illllch,or more, carbon and are aiso threatened by 
development. Likewise,in terms of biodiverSity, the Choco' 
I'egion that covers the Paciticcoasts of Ecuador, Colombia, 
,and Panama, is as rich as the Amazoll. Yet, there are no calls 
to internationatize these regions. 
To further complicate matters, most of the worki<s cocaine is 
. prod.uc~'d in areas that abut the Brazil·ian Anlazon. In . 

Columbia, the drug trade is finallCing a civil war along ' 

'B razil ' s border. The i3razilian government is concerned that 

by pledging $1.3 billion in aid to the governmcnr of · 

Colombia to tight the dn:lg cuteis and their guerilla allies, 

the United States may further fuel the long drug war, 

eventually sending it spilling into Brazil. ~'We know that 

once the gringos have strengthened the army's. hand thae, 

we may ·gl·t whacked too," said Mauro Sposito, head of the 

new Brazilian Ji:>n:e here . "So this operation ("Cobra") was 

ulldertakc.n as a preventive measure) in'anticipation of. 

whalJ:ver problems may come our \v.ay. " " · TI ·- · .
liS operatl.on 

concerns Brazil bq::ause it' shares a large border with 

Colombia (about 1,600 square kilometers), allpost all of 

which is covered bv the An~azon rain torest. Because ·the 

.Anuzon rain tixes; is very dense, supen;ising. the entire area 
is virtually impossible. As a result, 'one government estimate 
. indicates that Brazil must' invest around US $10 billion over 
.the next 5 to 10 years in military equipment and facilities if 
it hopes to'adequately supervisl' the area. l • 
Amazon L 1iks 
Brazil's Domestic Backlash' 
T
he term "Internationalization of the Amazon" is a concept 
that devel(lped in Brazil based on -its. fear of an 
il~ternationall1lilitarv invasion or other direct intertCrence in 
the a~ea. Although 'the idea of taking the AmazOll fi-om 
Brazil and placing it. under international auth~)rjty may seem 
absurd to those outside the country, the concern is very real 
within Brazil. Brazilian politicians and the military, both of 
whom tJvur a thorough '''devdopment'' of Amazonia as a 
means ofproteeting Brazil's claim to it, h.lve criticized the 
activities of international environmental organizations .lIld 
non-governmental 'Organizations (NGOs) as an 
enctoachment upon Brazil's so\'ereignty. Brazil's n ighbors· 
. share this lx'lief. In their dcclaration ()f San Francisco de . 
Quito of Marcl 1989/; the tcm:igll millistt~l"S of the Amazon 
countries rep~diated any intertcrellce with the policies anu 
measures of these states \,is-'J-\ j . the Amazon region . Tak.ing 
an old arguOlt'nt of the Brazilian military, the former 
pr~sjdent of Brazil, Jose Samey, even accused the 
industrialized COUll tries of \V()rking toward the 
: intcfIlatiOilalization of the Ainazon regi(in under the pretext _ . 
of environmental protection . . He discollnted the eff()rts of 
governmental and IH)(1 -go\'enimental agencies to 'protect the. 
Amazon rain fi.m:st, I.lbeling rheir -actions rilaliciolls; 
atrocious, and· dishonest. According to Sarney, the 
international criticism of the Brazilian Amaz;m polk.y was 
part ·of.l larger cJmpaign to prevent Brazil from lIsing its 
natural wealth and becoming a world power. l " • 
Hist~ry of the Militarization and Economic 

Development of the· Amazon 

E
stablished in 19.6.4 and in control ()~. Brazil's econ omy tor 
20 years, the mIlitary gm'c rn ment ngorously pushed 

forward the developmentaf Amazonia. Though the 

opening lip of the Amazon frontier is' in accord with the 

logic 'of Brazilian histor)', or 'rather its historic pattnll of 

internal colonization the militarv Ius intluenced lhe 

t'conomic rel~etrati(;:l of the region . This cam paign was 

intended to mi tigate social contlict and to mobi~ze political 

support for till' current regime. The military believed that 

tapping this vast .1 I'l'a's resourCl'S would automatically 
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eill)ance the status of the country globally. At the same 
time, penetration of Amazonia oftered new pr'ospects for 
strengthening the economic base of the military and for 
opening up testing gr(~unds for special military projects, 
including nuclear installations. 
Importantly, by developing and militarizing me area, the 
Brazilian military governments also sought to preempt the, 
internationalization of the Amazon by establishing sovereign 
control over the region . With this goal in mind, they 
delineated several projects to develop and integrate the. 
region. During the period of 1964 to 1984, Brazil's , 
economy grew to becomc the eighth largest in the world. 
Domestically, it began producing everyming from needles to 
supersonic aircraft. It also d~vcloped an impressive military­
industrial complex. Aside trom in~rea.sing me size of Brazil's 
economy and military"the government had tlle following 
goals: ' 
• the need for 'national inte,gration,' which would 
bring the Amazpnia and its resources into the 
country's economic mainstream; 
• 	 the need for "physical integration" of 
Amazonia into the ,rest of the country to 
ward ofT foreign 'gt;opolitical interests; 
• 	 ,th<; need to provide a proper -response to 
the pressure of national and transnational 
cOIT)panies with respect to tlle use of the 
region's resources. 
The basic instruments used to pursue these 
objectives included direct investment by the 
Federal government of Brazil in infrastr.ucture, 
including providing fiscal incentives t(~ private , 
businesses under the supervision ofa federal 
agency. Large progranis Of. projects, either 
government-sponsored or government-inspired, 
were organized and supported. fiscal incentives, 
including tcitql or partial ex.e.mption trOtll tederal 
and state taxes, as well as credits and subsidies, 
were created as,the backbone of the econorilic 
policy for the region. Importantly, the 
government's initial investments in infrastructure 
were directed at constructing new roads to 
provide access to a'1dfacilitatc further 
cl'evCtopment in Amazoni"a. 
The combination of these two factors, fiscalinccn.tiws and 
new roads, suc.ceeded in finally ~)pening the rcgi<>I1 to ' 
Brazilian and interna~ional· capital. Big businesses and ,privJte 
entrepreneurs acquired large tracts of land, oti:en for 
speculative· purposes only.17 . 
The Amazon in·the Post-MII!tary Era 
T
he military's fall from power in the mid-1980s did nm 
signal a retreat from the Amazon area. The continuation 
of the Brazilian doctrine of national security allowed tllt, , ' 
military to continue with its self-proclaimed task of 
"bringing me region home tc? the country. " Ecological 
considerations had little weight compared to this rlational 
challenge. Amaz(mia had apparently turned into an exercise 
,in geopolitics. From a geopolitical viewpoint of inaimaiiling 
territorial status quo with its neighboring countries, the 
problem of Amazonia for Brazil was not one of tm> many 
people working 'in 'me area but rather one of too few. 
Consequently, the military steadily increased its presence in 
the border regions. To this purpose, the Brazili.1l1 
government initiated the "Calha Norte'; ("north roof 
guttcr") project in me early 1980s, later supplementing it 
witll a similar project along the Bolivian border. Along with 
the region 's new infi'astructure, the two projects pro'vided 
strong inceiltives fC)r private in'vesrmeLlt in the area. 
At the same time, the militarization ofthe northern border 
has exacerbated the civil war in Columbia between the 
governn;ient and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), that has at times spilled over into Braziliail 
territory. The 'recent announcement of a massive U.S', 
military aid package for Columbia will most likely further 
- ' 
escalate fighting along the Colombian-Brazilian border and 
lead to an evell greater buildup in Brazilian fi>rces and 
intl'astructure, complicating eft()rts to protect the Amazon. 
Recent Opinion in Brazil 
O ne might be tempted to dismiss these concerns ~nd . policies as rdies of Brazil's militarycil1dustrial complp. 
Unfortunately, the perceived .threat of '~intcrnationalization" 
can be tC)lllld in the ml:dia as well. - For instance, in an article 
fc)r the Brazilian magazine, 'Manchac, the well-Known 
journalist Clr\OS Chagas accused the devdoped countries of 
wanting to take the A\l1aZOn away frol'n thi: ' Brazilians. To 
illustrate his point, he q~loted several distinguished 
PR,,! , 20 
. international.persons and institutions: 
• 	 "Contrarv to wha·t the Bra7jlians think, the Amazon 
belongs t~ ewryone!" AI (!on:, Vicc-Prcsidc;lt o"f 
the United States, 1992; 
• 	 '~Brazil has to accept par.tial sovcrcignt)' uver the 
Amazon," Fran~oi.s . Mittcrrand, former president of 
Fra.nce, 1989; . 
• 	 "Brazil has to delegate part of its rights to the 
Amazon to competent International Organizations," 
Mikhajl Gorbachev; former president of the e:,:­
Soviet Union, 1992;. . 
• 	 "Only internationalization ca.n saw the Amazon," 
"Grou·p of One Hundred," 1989; and . 
• 	 "The Amazon has to be untoucllable, because it is 
humankind's supply of t()rest," the 1990 Congress 
ot' German ·Environmentalists.'" 
Chagas also notes that the idea·to internationalize the 

Amazon. is not a new one, hiwing originated in the 19'h 

century. As further evidence, Chagas points to a map that 

.	portends to create the "Sovereign State of Amazon" ( Sl~/, 

box ), th.us distralKhisillg Brazil. 

In an article in the 1110st prestigious newspahxT of Sao Paulo, 
·Fnlha de Sao Paulo, Ariano Suassuna pointed to the United 
States'·I~aving indkated that ddilfestation of the Amazon is 
a vital threat to the safety ()f Americans as a basis for 
Brazilians to worry about international interference.'" Even 
though Suassuna opposed the military's rule in Brazil, he 
qol1t,thCless asks Brazilians to join the army ifdirect 
AIJlc·riGln mili~ary interference occurred within the region. 20 
The politician Joaquim Luccna said in 1999 that direct 
international interference in the Amazon is abollt to begin . 
J.llcena cited a declaration made· by Henry .l(jssinger in 
1975, in which .Kissinger said that because in 300 years the 
world's remaining natural resources\\'OlJld be in tht~ control . 
of incapable countries, the United State.s shuuld obtain 
. control of these resourn:s. Kissingcr ·then concluded that 
United States could offer a deal to Brazil; the exchange of 
the Brazil.ian external debts for the Amazon .2' 
Also, the well-known Brazilian Senat(ir Jarbas ·Passarinho, 
·'vrote several articles in newspapers· about tht, 
internationalization of and the toreign interterence in the 
Amaion.l1 As a respected politician and a retired rililitary 
officer \(,ho held several important positions in the Brazilian" 
government during military and civil governmems, 
Passarinho's opinion carries great influence in Braiil..· His 
. reputation is based in large part on his efforts to hdp with 
the transition tonn military to Civil gO\ferllmenrs:. Passarinho 
I~as stated that the Amazon is part of Brazil's territory and 
that the ·world must respect Brazil's sovereign rights. He 
·also points out that the United States destroyed large areas 

of its territory and Brazil did not interfere in that matter. 

Making reference t? a" rnilitary threat,. Passarinho noteS the 

UnitL"d States' interference in Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, ;lIid 
other COllntries and wonders what is to stop the United 
States fi'om interft:ring in Brazil. Claiming that the 
· envirOlllilent.is merely a convenient pretext for eventual 
niiJjtary inten:cntion, Passari!lho contends that the United 
· States is really conctTned with controlling. the Amazon 's 
·natural resources. . 
The debate over internationalization of the Amazon is tar 
fi'om over . . Recl'ntly, on October 23, 2000, Cristovam . 
Buarque, a former governor of Brasilia (BraziI's capital), 
wrote an article tix a Braziljan newspaper saying that if 
pe{)plc think that the Amazon belol1gs to hw':'ankind, then 
the Louvre Museum, the oil sOlJl'ces, the City of London, 
thl~ international capital markets, etc., should be 
internationaljzed as weIl. l ' 
-
Against this backprop, the U .s . Ambassador to Brazil , Mr. 
Anthony S. Harrington, officially stated on June 12,2000, 
that the,rumors about the global 
coml111111ity internationalizing the 
Am,\zon are "grotesq lie myth," and 
"it bas disturbed the rd3.tionship 
between Brazil and United States for 
years ." Continuing, he· said, "Let me 
say that in the ·inost possible clear 
way: rhe United States ·absolutely 
docs not have any interest to invade. 
the Amazon . The An.lazon bck>ngs 
to B razii. " 14 
Conclusion 
The sustainable devdopment of the Brazilian Amazon is of common 

concern to humankind, but final 

responsibility and authority OVI:'I" the· 

mauagementof this area lies with· the 

people of Brazil. Preservation efforts 

that jttempt to internationalize the 

Amazon, while well intentioned, 

create a backlash in Brazjl 'against 

international conservation efforts. 

This backlash is reflected in Brazilian 

military and dc\:.clopment policies . . 

Fear of losing sovereignty over the 

regi0l1 has lead to a series of 

programs to develop and militarize 

· the AmazoR . . In ,111 indirect way, the 
very same international groups· that 
would protect th~ Amazon are 
hastening its destruction by 
advoGlting programs that do not take 
",ldequate account of Brazilian . 
sovereignty. Any international plan of 
action tix the preservation of tht' 
Amazon sho~ld be initiated and lead 
by Brazil. 
. 
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A Defense of the·'U.S~Pos,itio'n on 

Labeling Genetically N\odified 

Organisms 

By SalZv K Kirsch!' 
GMO's and the 
Precautionary Principle 
Since its inception in t~e carly , 1970's, the fidd of bIotechnology has rapidly expanded: In its 
simplest application, biotechnology is 
the insertion of a speci6ed protein 
chain (gene) into the DNA ofanother 
organism creating a genetically 
modified organism (GMO), This 
change in the structure ()f an' 
organism's DNA results in the 
manifestation of a specified 
characteristic by the modified organism, 
This technolngy has numerous 
belle6cial applications, from drugs and 
food to cloning, however these benefits 
harbor numerous potential' risks . 
Currently, one of the most 
controversial applications of 
biotechnology is to food products 
intended for direct humah 
consumption, 
Biotechnology has been ~sed in plants 
to create drollght resistant corn and 
soybe,ms, increase the nutritional' 
content of core food crops, create pest 
resistant plants, as well as more 
cosmetic applications such as the 
creation of a tomato whose consistency 
remains stable longer. Currently, 
genetically engineered plants make up 
over one-third of our soyhean crop and 
one-quarter of our corn crop. Over 
98,600,000 acres were planted with 
genetically engineered plants in .l999 . 
While there is no scientific evidence 
that genetically modified organisms. arc 
harmful to humans or the environment, 
some consumer advocates and 
environmentalists argue that a 
precautionary approach should be used 
when' dealing the GMOs! 
The precautionary principle is , 
elaborated in the Rio Declaration 
'which states that "[w ]hcre there are 
th~cats ofserious or irreversible 
damage, lack of tull sci(mtific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to 
o prcvel1t enviromnental damage ."1 This 
principle has been adopted in 
numerous international' environmental 
insrntments including the Preamble 'of 
the Biodiversity Convention" and 
ArticlC 3.3 ofrhe United Nations 
Framework Convention on CLimate 
Change: The principle developed in 
recognition that scientific '~certainty" 
often COmes too late to prevent 
environmental harm, It does not 
dictate what action to take, but rather 
it advises when a ?olicy should be 
considered: before the harm has taken 
place.s In theory this seems 
uncontrovcrsial, but in application it 
has many pitfalls. Bodansky points out 
that it is "impractical to view every 
activity with sllspicion."" The 
international community has taken the, 
precautionary principle to mean that 
GMOs should be labeled while the 
United States takes the opposite 
position . 
Americans have been reluctant to 
accept genetically engineered fi>ods, 
Calgene's "F1avr-Savr" tomato did not 
receive a round of applause from 
consumers1 and t,he sale of the tomato 
seems to have stallc<~i in the Mid-West. 
Recently, large tood producers, slIch as 
Prito-Lay and Gerber, have abandoned 
the lise of genetically engineered 
sovbeans and corn in their products. 
TI~e question is, why? As of yet theloe 
have been no studks revealing 
deleteriolls side dkcts or other health 
risks from these products, and 
consumers have not yet. gone so tar as 
to boycott these products, 
In the absence of hard scientific proof 
that these products arc dangerous, 
certain consumer groups have been 
fanning the Hames of opposition. Yet, 
e\'en given the rising concern in the 
U.S ., consumers, continued to purchase 
these products. There arc variolls 
reasons for the public's continued 
purchase of genetically engineered 
foods. One theory is that consumers 
arc neither afraid' ot~ no'r opposed to 
the usc of these products in their food. 
The other theory is that American 
consumers have had no choice but to 
cat these genetically engineered 
. ingredients - the consumer simply docs 
not know which products contain, and 
which products do not coma,in, 
genetically engineered material. 
The American public wants to see this 
information on' the label - polls taken 
by Time and MSNBC in January 1999 
and January 2000 respectively, showed 
that 8l % of the people who responded 
were in tavor of'Jabcling genetically 
engineered prOlillCts, However, both 
the FDA and industry claim that 
labeling should not be mandatory. 
FDA maintains th~ position is that, 
genetically engineered plants are no 
different from their traditional 
counterparts, therdore the fact that the 
product is genetically engineered is not 
material information and does not need 
to be labeled with anything but the 
tohd's common or usual name (e.g. 
'corn', 'soybean'). COl1s11mers seem to 
teel otherwise, and there arc a number 
of vocal groups seeking change. 
Whether or not labeling would actually 
aff(:ct the decision to purchase a 
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product is, as of yet; unknown. 
Possibly, consumer-reaction would be 
similar to that of"the decision to . 
pl~rchase an organically grown- product 
- It would be a decision ba-sed on 
- personal preference and beliefs about 
health and lifestyle. ~o matter Iiow a 
COnSl.ln1er purchase decision is made 
. the debate is on as to whether these' 
products should bear J label..A number 
of consumer groups have launched a 
. "Consurner Right-to-KnO\V" campaio-n
- eo 
to require labeling, and some states 
have taken similar ballot initiatives. In 
the absence. of state power to require 
labeling, Congress has proposed 
legislation that would require such ­
products tl) bear a label. 
Though these products do not bear a 
label, they have not gone unregulated. 
The US Government .regulates 
biote~hnology luidcr th;ee separate . 
agellcles - the EPA, the USDA, and the 
FDA. By the_time genetically ­
engineered fObU products r~ach' the 
mafkt't ~?lace they have gone through a 
s~nes ot government approvals and are 
quite tit for human consumption . In 
the absence of health risks, 
manufacturers ,vho US\;: geneticall\' 
modified products should not be ' 
required to label these products. 
However, though consuiner 
apprehensions about gencticall'f' ­
engine-ercd foods mav be unfo~nded 
an individual does h;ve the right to ' 
ma~e. a free and informed purchasing 
deCISIOn, rheret()re manufacturers who 
. . prder not to use genetically engineered 
pn~ducts should be free to 'prO\~ide a· ­
label to that .eHect. This form of 
lab~ling would be akin to the "organic" 
and "Kosher" l;ybels that arc found on 
food products that meet those 
qualifications. 
This paper briefly examines the 
international position on labeling 
GMO's, then looks at the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration's policy 
regarding labeling GMO's and 
concludes by defending the U.S. 
position. 
International Appfication of 
the Precautionary Principle 
to GMOs- -­
- . 
All, fllods sold in the EU that contain - GMOs must pe labeled.' This 

requirement is triggered bv the 

~?resence of DNA or prot<;in resulting 

1rom genetic modification." The EU ­
i-cgulations provided tl lr the accidental _ 
presence of GMO -materi:)l by requiring 
that products containing less than 1% 
-of GM material do not have to be. 
labeled ." The specific requirements ofa 
GMO label are contaiiled in 
Commission Regul;uion 50/ 2000. ­
The objective of these EU policies is to 
"prom()te a balanced approach to 
;biotechnology al1d GMOs in partiLlilar. 
fhe public needs to be assulTd of the ­
_ !lighest protection of public health, and 
the CIlviromllCJ1t, including the . 
protection of biodivcrsitv. At the same 
time they need to be abl'e to make an 
informed (hoice with regard to GMO 
products. "HI ­
The E U position is echoed iri the ~vOrk 
of the Codex Alimentarius _ 
Commission, a joint project of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the- UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO). -The Codex 
Committee on Fdod Labeling meet in 
- May 2000 w draft recornlm:nded 
.changes in the general standards for 
labeling of prepackaged f(10d. These 
draft standards take into account GMO 
issues and will be presented to the 
general meeting of the Codex in 200 l. 
The committee's recommendations call 
for mandatory labeling of t()od or 
~ngre~ients that contains an "~rganism 
111 wllll:h the genetic material has been 
changed through gene technology ina 
way that docs not occur -naturally by 
multiplication and/or - ' 
r,ecombination."" The Codex 
negotiations are important because thev 
reflect a growing Cl~nsus in rhe ' 
international community on the issue 
This is especially impor~ant sinc~ the . . 
issu~ ofGMO i:rade and labeling is · 
expected to be including in the next 
round ofwrO negotiations.1l The 
GMO issue proved to be a major 
stumbling block- at the wrn 
Ministerial in 'Seattle last year 
One of the most ·! l11portant recent 
developme.nts in international GMO 
labeling is the Biosaterv Protocol to the ­
Convention on _Biologicat Di,"ersitv that 
regulates the transboundarv movcl~ent 
?f bio-engineered organ.isn;s.l.l The 
Protocol referees to these GMOs as 
"living modified organisms" (LMO) . 
It j'rovides that ~ party must have the 
advanced inf()rmeti agreement (AlA) of 
an importing country prior to the 
shipment of the LMQ. The label of an 
LMO that is intendcd for introduction 
illto the environment must ~ontain the 
identity and relevant traits of that 
L\;IO . CommOdities that arc not 
intl'l1ded tor introdunioil into the ­
ellvironmt'nt, inclllding food, need only 
state that the product "ma\' contain" . 
LMO and specifY a contac~ point for 
nlrther intormation. 
The ElJ-regulations,Oldex draft, and ­
Biosafcty Protocol each reflect' a view 
that the pr:cautionary prinCiple 
requires labeling of GMOs. Contrast 
this to the US policy. 
US Regulation of GMOs 
n 1976, concerned about the risks· 
associated with research of 
biotcchnology applications, th~ 
. National Institute of Health p~blislll,:d 
_ biott:\:;hnology researc"ll guidclin~s for 
their grapt recipients"which were ­
adopted by oth<::r government agencies 
as well as pri~'ate industrv.'· After the 
inttial research is comple~l'd, the . 
product continues to be .regulated 
under a coordinated fralnework. This 
~oordinated framework was published 
III 1986 by the Office of Science and 
Technolog~f Policy as the "Coordinated 
liramework for Regulation of -_­
Bi()tcE"hnology; Anno~ncemei1t of 
Pplicy and ~otice for Public 
Comment"." The cornerst(jne of the 
policy was drat the existing laws of t:he 
fDA, the EPA, the USDA, the NIH 
and the OSHA would adequately cover 
this new and burgeoning t·eclmo·logy. ,. 
As disc.lIssed above, the NIH issued 
·guidelines for research on 
biotechnology; Though these 
I -
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Romina Picolotti'is the Fourider and Executive Director of the Center for Human Rights and the Environment 
(CEDHA), located in Cordoba Argentina. . 
CEDHA is the" only non-governmental organiz,lti6n in L1dn America uniquely dedicated to the defense and 
promotion of the environ!11ent and human rights, serving as a bridge between 'these two areas of international law. 
CEDHA works with civil sOliery' leaders~ non-governmental organizations, the academic sector, public sector servants, and 
other actors; providing advisory assistance, training 'and n;sources to address environmental and human rights concerns. 
CEDHA objectives are to develop and strengthen: a) the awareness orthe linkages between the environment and human 
rights, further advancing environmental and human' 'rights legislation at the local and international levels; b) the capactt)' 
, and ability of judges, attorneys, advocates, and .other actors to address the local and international defense and promotion of 
the environmelit and human rights through the linkages between these two areas of law; and c) resources that provide 
tools to successfully defend and promote environment and human rights at the loc11, national, regio~al, and international 
levcls. ' 
Ms. Picolotti is a graduate of the National University of Cordoba, Argentina. In addition she holds a Masters Degree 
in International Law from the American Universitv's Washington College of Law where she is a member of the adjunct 
faculty teaching human rights and the environme,~t. She has \,'orked with international and I';ultilaterjlinstitutions in . 
Latin America, Asia; and Ul1ite~ States (includilig the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and 
numerous non-governmental organization) advocating at the local and international level. 
In 1995 she joined,an international task f(lrCe of human rights advQcates to assist Cambodia in reestablishing its 
judicial system tollowing an era of egregious human rights violations. She served as advisor and trainer to the Cambodian 
Judicial System, mentoring judges and prosecutors on legal theory and practice, training prison staff and police on human 
rights and facilitating Iluman rights and other civil socit;ty groups' participation in the judicial 'process. She later joined 
the International Humal,\ Rights 'Law Group in Washington, DC as Legal Officer fCJr Latin America, where she totused 
her work on dctending and pron10ting human and environmental rights of indigenous commuQities, Afro-Caribbean 
populations, and wQrnen. Ms. Pjcolotti designed the Law:Group's Nicaragua Program oftering in situ mechanisms 
strengthening civil society and improving access to -justice. As. Latil' America Legal Officer of the Law Group, Ms. 
Picolotti headed international litigation bdore the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights, identilYing 
victims of human rights and environmental abuse and bringing their complaints to the Inter-American system. 
She has extensive experience in the International' Human Rights System~ haVing worked with various actors of the 
system, incll,ding the Inter-Ame'rican Commission on Human Rights where she r'eviewed and analyzed petitions t()[ 
admissibility and ' legal sl1bstance, Jnd with the Washington based Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), 
reviewing and preparing cases going before the system, Ms. Picolotti works in collab~ration with other prominent 
institutions dedicated to the defense and promotion of human rights and environmental law. She regularly works with the 
faculty at Amt;rican University in r:eviewing and analyzing elements of international la\y in ~c1cct cases bdore 'the Inter­
American System. Ms. Picolotti also' litigates in tandem with other non-govcrnmemal organizations such as CIEL, 
CEJIL, and the Indian Law Resource Center, in the preparation and defense of cases' before the Inter-American System. 
As part of an international strategy to 'foster environmental issues in human rights tribunals, CEDHA has tihi several 
amicus briefs before the Inter-A1TIerican Human Rights System pressing the system to recognize elwironmental human 
rights cases. In the ,first landmark case in defense 'If the Awas Tingni Indigenous Coml~1l1nity of Nicaragua, the Intcr­
American Court on HU1)lan Rights admitted the brief~ prepared by CEDHAa and the Center for International 
Environ~11'ntal l~aw (CIEL), which argues' in favor of protecting the crucial linkage between the environment and the 
human rights of the Awas Til1gni. The tribunals succeeded in halting logging concession in indigenous territories , In the 
second case, involving the Wichi and other indigenous peoples of Argentine, another case with high environmental and 
human rights c(;ntent1 the Inter-American Commission pressed the Argentine governnient to move towards, a friendly 
settlement, halting public \vorks in a multi~million dollar transnationai ri.)~d project linking Brazil to Chile (through 
Argentina), cutting through the heart o(protecteq indigenous territories threatening the extinction of the culture and. 
lifestyles of the Wichi,Chorotc, Chulupi, Toba, and Tapietc' con1munitics. Again, CEDHA and CIEL prepared a brief that 
was accepted by the Commission. The COllrt and the Commission's decisions il~ each case have had stgniflcam ' 
precedence indicating that inteniational human rights tribunals have begun to recognize the sYlilbiotic rClationsh.ip 
existin.g betweeil huma'n rights and the el1vin)I1I11ent. 
For 11t01'C ill/ormntion'abo1lt these briefs or the CmtcrjiJr Human Ri..~/Jts and t/Jf Elll'i1"lmmC1lt (CE[)HA) J'isit 
http://ll'}}Jll'.CEDHA'.oi;g.m·orcontactJ>l"Ofcss()1·Pico/ottiatI"011Iil1a@udim.lJIg.ar. 
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guidelines arc l1(it m;lI1da,torv fed~rJ.1 
as'sistancecan, be withdr,lwn °if" the 
, researcher ·does not ·abide bv the 
rcquii·cmenrs. The guideliI~cs f()Cus on 
containment procedures which are . 
based on the risk the. organism might 
pose, and there are "increasinglv 
stringent containment conoditi~H;s" for 
~ach of t()ur biosafcty k\oelso 17 After the 
~echnolpgy itself has been researched, 
Its, app~icatioll is subject to n:gulation 
,pnmanly under three government 
agencies - the Envi ronmental 
Protection Agency, the United S~ates 
Departmcnt ofAgriculrure, and the 
Food and Drug Adillinistration..The 
USDA regulates plant pests, plants , and 
veterinary biologics. Th(,: EPA is the ' 
agency with primary authority over the ' 
~eglilation of pesticidal biotechnolog;'. 
flUIS, the EPA's regulat()ry .llithorit\; 

· l:nters only where the plant contain; i 

p~sticidal .con~ponent, tt:)r exanlpll' Bt 

Corn, which has a pesticidal eftCn of 

· the European Corn Bord' and Bow 
Weevils. The Food ~nd Drug 
Administr.1tion (FDA) regulates fi)ods 
with GMOs. . 
Like the USDA and tbe EPA~ the FDA ' 
regulates bioengint'ered products under 
its existing reglilawry framework .. The 
· 'F?A be((1mes a party to the regulation ' 
of these products onI" as the\, near 
commercialil-arion. FDA nlade clear in ' 
· 1992 that it regarded biotechnology as 
a mere extension of the practices of ' 
genetically manipulation that have been 
practiced since the inception of . 
agriclll~ure . . In gencral, the FDA's ' 
position has been that where a 
moditlcation is made to a plant, so long 
as the new plant variety is suftlciently 
close to its traditional counte~part i~ . 
. compositiori, nutritive value, utility and' 
the like, the common or usual llar;l~ , 
, still applies . The fDA regulates these 
pbns under the FDGA in term~ of both 
pr.e-market approval and labeling., ' 
Discussed below is a gcneral overview 
of tbe regulatory stru~n;re under which 
FDA regubtcs the labeling and . 
classification of genericaIlv modified 
toods. . ' 
Requirements 
he p(~licy of.the federal Food, l?rug, T,md CosmetIc Act (fDCA) is "tc) , 
. insure the conslllll,er that t{)ods an:' pure 
and wholesume, sate t() e,lt, and ' 
produced lindersanitarv 
conditions ... a·l~d that ;tli labeling and 
packaging is truthful', informative, lnd 
not dei:cptive."I" Two primarv 
princi les f(>und 'in the FDCA §§ 
403( a)( 1) and §20 1 (n) guide FDA's 
labeling reLJ~lirements respectivdv. The 
tlrst ~uidi ng principle, § 403( a)( i), is 
that food labels must Ilot be ~'false or 
misleading in any particular. " "J A t()od . 
will tJ..i1 this test if it omIts l~ssl'ntial 
infixmJtion'" such as ingredients; 'net 
weight; name and address of the 
producer; and llanK of till' food to be 
pro\'ided . ~ 1 The .se(Ond guiding 
principle, fi.llflKt-in fDCA §201(n) . 
states that labeling is misleading to "the 
extent to which thelabding or~ 
advertising taiJs to reveal facts materiai 
in light of stICh n:prescntatioilS or 
ma~crial ' with respect to consequcnCt~s 
whICh may result from thee use of the ' 
article to which the labeling or 
advert.ising relat.es."11 .fDA has 
interpr~ted ' tlie secollci part of §20 I(11) 
to reqUIre the labding of ingn:dients 
th~t may adversely afkct a consumer. 
The FDA has a separate policv 
regulating food additives. Fo'od 
addtrives .1re: 
substrt1lces.Jphich mav by their 
' ••• intended /tses bcc01n~ c~mpollcnts 
, offood, either direct~y. or i1ldi1wt/v, or 
which ma)' otherwise affi:ct the ­
characteristics u.fj'ood. 771C te1°m 
spci:ifimlly irJc/uda nnv SlI{1Jtl1l1Ct" 
intended jfw Tlsein plo~dTlcillg,. . 
mnllufnctllri1'lg. pac/ling, proCfssin/f. 
preparing. treating, packaging, ' 
transportmlJ, 01' holding the food, and 
nny SIJII I'C!' ofradinti~m intended for fill\' 
such tlsc.'.' ' . 
Food additives are ~ubject to pre- . . ' 
market approval by FDA under §409." 
To obtain approval, the manutacturer 
must prove to the FDA that the 
Iliateri.ll is safe for human usc. Evel~ 
though, §4Q9 requires t()(Ki additives H; 
three important and exte'nSI\ C ' 
c1assitlcations of additives wbich are 
cxen~pt from the testing and approval 
reqlllrement. The first categorv is ' 
materials that arc gener.1lly rec~)gnized 
~s safe (~RAS). The second category 
IS matenals that are subject to pri )r 
sanction, and the third categorv is 
111aterial.s that tall within a spe'citlc 
l~xcmption, such as color additives, . 
pesticide residues in Qr on ra\\: 
agricultural products, and new animal 
drugs." T he materials that t:11l into 
these thrn' categories are pen~litted to 
be used in f()()d without pre-market . 
licensing and testing under §409, For 
GRAS materjals, the burdel is on tht 
manufacturer to. aSSllre that the ~laterial 
is GRAS. In det0nnining if the 
material is GRAS, the manufacturer ·has 
the option of consulting with fDA to 
assure that such. a determination is 
appropriate, A GRAS Q'laterial . 
gene.rally has a long historv as a 
compon~nt qfhuma;l food or is 'simply 
not (Q~sIdered to be enough of a 
,threat to warrant pre-market review,"" 
Though these materials arc not subject ' 
, to pre:market approval and testing 
lynder §409, fDA requires that all f(>od 
additives, whether or not thev arc 
GRAS, to be; iabcled under §201(s), 
Howevl'r, there are exemptions trom 
the labeling requirel1l~nt. Food ' 
ingredients are exempt from the 
labeling requircll1c'nt when' 1 ev arc 
ha\'c bcen llsed as processing ailts, 
prcsent in insignitlcant amounts, aBd 
have COnf(>rl11ed tu the requirements of 
§409.17 Incidental in'grcdienrs arc ' 
th.ose that are ncit intt.'nded to be part ' 
ot the fond and serve no functional usc 
in the fini shed food product or are . 
"processing aids". These additives are 
often used in proct:ssing and 
manufacturing tcmd and ha\'~' tl;du 
with tht II ethod of production and .do 
n.ot ~~>nstitllte an ingredient , Processing' 
aIds nde along with a functional 
ingredient and do not ha\'e anv 
. function in the finished f(>od J~rodllCt, 
examples include pH adjusterli ii1d anti ­
caking agents lised in salt. 
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FDA: Labeling GMOs 
"FDA regards genetically engineered 
materi;ll in food is an "additive" 
under FDCA §201 (s ).' FDA's position 
on genetically engineered foods and the 
related labeling requirements \Vas . 
published in their 1992 policy on 
"i'Jew Plant Varieties".l" FDA's policy 
rests on a single rationale. This 
rationale, as stared in the overview of 
the policy, is that "[t]he regubtory 
status of a· fo.od, irrespective uf the 
method be which it is developed, is 
.dependant upon objective 
characteristics of the food and the 
intended usc· of ~he food (or its 
componen~s). " 19 
fDA regulates the satety of genetically 
engineered f()()ds primarily under two 
sections of the FDCA, thus covering 
both post-market and pre-market 
health and safety issues. FDA regulates 
post-market safety under§ 402(a)(1). 
Under §402(a)( 1) the burden. is on ~he 
producer to ensure that the food is not 
"adul.terated" . An adulterated t()od is 
one that is considered to have "an 
added poisonous or deleterious 
substance that may render the food 
injurious to health or J. naturally 
occurring substance that is ordinarily 
injurious. nUl. A"dulterated foods are 
unlawful and to subject various 
sanctions, trom removal from the 
market . to cri111inal pros'eClition b'y 
. FDA." 
To assure pre-markctsatet)', FDA 
regulates genetically engint'ered foods 
under §409 - the food additives 
amendment. New, genetic material 
being added to plants is considered an 
additive. "The statutory definition of 
'food additive' makes clear that it is the 
intended or exp.eqed introduction of a 
substance i.nto food ·that makes the ' 
substance potentially subject to food 
. additive regulations. ".U' Thus, FDA . 
requires that the components being 
add~ to the 'new plant variety be 
GRAS, or they will be subject to pre­
.market testing and apprO\;al,'lJi FDA 
position is that most of the new plant 
varieties will contain GRAS. material, 
When thc mbstallcc prcsent hI 
the fo04 is om that is' already · 
presmt atgcncmi(y comparable 
01 0 gfcate1· lellels in ctll'rCntly 
C011...fumed food, there is zmlikeli 
to be called itlto questi011 the 
presumed GRAS status ofsuch 
1tatumlZv occur1-ing mbsmnce . . 
Likewise, minor variati~ns in 
molecular structure ... would not 
ordinarily ajJect-the GRAS 
status." . 
It is only where a genetically 
engineered product is ' "significantly 
difterent in structure, function, or 
ainount than Sll bstances currently 
found in f()Od" that FDA treats it as a 
tood additive, therefore req uiring the 
same testing and pre-market approval 
that is required of other additives ,''' 
Genetically engineered crops that arc 
indistinguishable from traditional food 
crops arc not treated as additives, thus 
requiring no pn:-market approval.'b 
FDA's policy regarding labeling of 
genetically engil1l;ered materials 
heark~ns back to the original theme of 
the 1'992 policy - the new foods are 
subject to an objective standard, which 
is not based on the process thro~lgh. 
which they are .produced. Thus, the 
FDA does not require these product to 
bear any speciallabeling.37 FDA relies 
on the existing regulatory structure of 
§403(a) for labeling genetically 
engineered foods .in the 1992 policy. 
FDA maintains that consumers need 
only be int~mned on the label whell "a 
new plant variety differs trom its 
traditional counterpart such that the 
common or lI.sual name no longer 
applies, or if a safety or usage issue 
exists to which consumers must be . 
alerted. "3S 
When posed with the question "Why 
won't there be mandatory lapeling of 
genetically engineered foods?" FDA 
responded that "All plant breeding 
involves genetic manipulation 01' 
plants. " .lY This is indeed true. Humans 
havc been genetically engineering 
piants since agriculture was t1rst . 
developed . Genetic maniplliation, 
whether by crossbreeding or . . 
manipulating DNA, is not a new 
concep~" However, people have been 
preparing foods . since time began, Jnd 
FDA still requires ingredients to be . 
listed. FDA's poil~t is nut that genetic 
manipulation has always occurred, but 
rather that the manipulation of the 
plant is a proccss used in creating the 
food product. The FDA m~lintains that. 
it " ... does not require labeling to 
describe what technique was used in 
the development of a new variety .. . " 4 11 
Only "[w )hen the techniquc is used to 
significantly change the composition of 
a food, then labeling will be· . 
required~ "41 Jf the common or usual 
name of the plant would no longer 
apply, labeling would 'have to indicate 
this or risk being misbranded under 
§403(a). To date, a genetically 
engineered f()od has not been required 
to bear such a label. 
In sum: FDA's policy requires special 
lab~ling fo'r genetically engineered 
. toods only if: 
1 . 	 a '[genetically engineered 1t()od 
woukj need to be called hy a 
ditlerent or modified namc if 
its composition were 
significantly diftl~rent fr(jm its 
convcntionally grown 
counterpart 
2. 	 the nutritive value .has been 
. signifiGlIltly alten:d 
3. 	 safety issues exist: such as 
presence of an allergen '2 
In each of ~he above situations; the 
burdtOn is on the manutacture·r to provc 
that the gelietically engineered t()()d is 
no ditTerent from its traditional 
counterpart. FDA policy does 
encourage developers of genetiqlly 
el1girit~cred foods "to consult witll the 
agency before marketing, to ensure that 
aU safety mi.d · regulatory questions have 
been fully addressed."4.' It is the view 
of the industry that this consultation is 
voluntary - in qrder for it to be 
mandatory it would need to go 
through the traditional rukmaking 
proCt.'ss linder the Administrative 
Procedures Act. '" Thus, GRAS-ness is 
initially an industry determination and 
industry may never actually consult 
with the FDA when making the 
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detnmination,: Gi\cm the public's 
increasing awarene6S of the lack of. 
,regubtory on~rsight in this area, there 
has been pressure on the FDA to make 
. the consultation process a mandatory 
one. The 'issue that concerns a ,vide 
portion of the f()(id producing industry 
is that a change iii FDA policy would 
ha~e an adverse effect on the regulatory 
structure 'tor all GRAS materi'll,' not 
just geneticallv engineered f()ods, It is 
'most likelv an~i most scnsibk, however, 
for the FDA to stru('tllre a rule which 
speciflGdJy targets genetically modi tied 
toods in this arena , The FDA would 
need to do ,this delicatelv, so as not to 
C10cate a public relations 'catastrophe for 
the biotech industry by creating the 
assumption that these products an: 
inhen~ntly .dangerous given the 'already 
skeptical' public perception of 
genetically engineered products. 
The Courts: Consumer Right­
to-:Know 
The current controversy over labeling genetically engineered material in , ' 
n>od is 'akin to the recent bimlc iwer 
the presence of Recombinant Bovine 
So matotrophin (rBST) in milk. RBST is 
a gel~etically nlanutactured hormone 
that is 'equivalent to 'bovine growth 
hormone natllrally produced by cows. 
The effect of this hormone is to 
increase both g rowth and milk 
prodllction in cattle! ' By t'rea~ng 
cattle, a dairy producer can contrQI 
both the volume of milk the cows 
produce and when they prodUCl'. it . 
There has been significant controversy 
betwTen the public, industry and the . 
goyernment in n:gard to rSST. 
Though there i~ no detectable 
difterence in the levels of rBST found 
in milk from treated versus untreated 
. cows, ~Ild consumers cannot taste the 
difference, the public, has been 
generally adverse to the idea of treJting 
cows. '" Consumers have objected to 
the use of rBST because of the ' 
, potential "debilitating eHects the drug 
mav havt' on animals ... the unknown 
and long term impact that use of the 
drug might have all human . 
health . . . 1and1the drug'S potential to 
affc'ct the socioeconomic fi>LIndation of 
the d~~iry industry." '" -Like all 
genetically engineered products, 
because the tre<\ted milk was 
indistingujshabk from tr~ditionai 
untrcated milk, FDA d6es not require ' 
treated milk to be labck d . IX 
In response to -this policy, Vermont 
passed a statuterequiriHg that '~I'ilf 
rBST has been used in the production 
of milk or a milk product for retail sale 
in this state,' the retail milk or milk , 
product shall bt" .labeled as such."4. 
Various dairy pl'oducers fiicd suit 
seeking prel.iminary injunctive relief 
keeping the,statute from being 
cnt(m.:ed. Their claim was that this 
statute violated both the First 
Amendment and the C:()mmerc~ 
Clause . The plaintiffs First 
Amendment argument was that they 
were being fl)("ced to speak against their 
will . Vcrmont"detcndCd its position by 
asserting that it h~ls a l;ubstan~ial state 
interest in tht, labeling requiremet:lt 
b~cause its citizens (ksired and needed 
this infc>nnation to make an informed 
purchase decision. The 2nd Circllit 
COlirt held that the statute indeed 
violated the First Amendment .'" 
The Court discussed the application of 
the First Amendment to commercial 
speech and applied the Supreme 
Court's test in Central Hudson" to 
determine whether Vermont's statute 
violated the First Amelldment 
protections Oll commercial speech. Th 
Hudson test has f(>ur parts: "( 1 ) 
whether the expression concerns lawful 
activity and is not misleading; (2} 
whether the government's interest is 
substantial; (3) whether the labeling 
,law directly serves the asserted interest; 
and (4) whether the labeling taw is not 
more extensive than necessary. " '2 The 
statl"s interest in the speech nlust 
"'demonstrate that the harms it recites 
are real al1d that its restriction will in 
fact alleviate them to a ma'terial 
degree,"S,' 
The court ultimately determined that 
VemlOnt had failed to meet the 
'requirement that thl' statl"s interest be 
substantial and held ,that " ...consumer 
" ·curiosity alone is not a strong enough 
state interest to sustain the compulsion 
of even an accurate, factual ' 
statement. " ;< . Thus, a state cannot 
'force manutacturers to speak against 
their will - it ,is a' violation of First .' 
Aniendment rights. The Second , 
Circuit noted that "[ \\.- lere consumer 
interest alone sllfflciem, there is n~) end 
~o the intormation that states could " 
require manutactllrers to disclose about 
their.production methods.";; ' 
The questicin that naturally arises is 
what makes information 111aterial or 
~ssential ell0ugh to requir~ disclosure 
uilder tllc FDCA as well as what 
constitutes a substantial state interest. 
As discussed above, FDA believes that 
information about a tood is material 
only when' that food is, significantly ' 
different in composition or hUlCtion 
from its traditional counterpart . FDA's 
view is qn objective standard of 
stru,cnire and function at the time of 
consu,mption. The consume.r'view 
differs in a fundamental way from ' 
FDA's view. The consumers' view 
focuses on the, product' at the time o f 
pl'oduction, rather than at the time of 
consumptioll . Thus, if the' process by 
which the tood is produced is materially 
different frol11 the way 'a tradit!onal 
tood is produced, that tact warral1ts 
labeling. . . 
Recent Developments 

in the US ­
L
e.gislation has been introduced in 
both the US House~O and SenatelS7 

, to n:quire labeling of gene'tically 
engineered mall;r;al in tood products. 
goth bills dearly statc that genetically 
engint..ercd foods and ingredients are 
"material" and therefore must be 
labeled for the consumer, ' These bills 
clearly overrule the fDA's 1992 Policy . 
Each bill was still in commirtc'e at the 
close of the 106th Congress and little 
,movement seel'ns likely in the near 

future. 

l10use Bill 
On November 16, '1999, the 

"Genetically Engineered Food Right 

To Know Act;' was put bdon: the ' 
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House "to require that, food that 
contains genetically engineered 
material, or that is produced with 
genetically engilleered material, be 
labeled accordingly."'· The Bill clears 
up the question of whether gen'etically 
engineered foods arc "material". It 
simply ~tates that the "process of 
genetically engineering foods results in 
the material change of such fClods . "' " 
The Bill amends FDCA §403 to 
includes a section requiring that all 
foods that contJ.in a genetically 
engineered organism or rnaterial (even , 
if undetectable) to be labeled with the 
following : 
GENETICALLYENGfNEERED 

UNITED STATES GOVERNME~T 

NOTICE: THIS PRODUCT 

CO~TAINS A GENETICALLY 

ENGINEERED MATERIAL, OR 

WAS PRODUCED WI~rH A 

GENETICALLY ENGINEERED 

MATEIUAI. ,"" 

Senate Bill 
Also titled the "Genetically Engineered ' 
Food Right-tn-Know Act", the Senate 
yersion\~as introduced on February 22, 
WOO by 'Sen , BarbarJ. Boxer (D-CA). 
This bill is substantially simj-Jar to the ' 
House version, though there arc a few 
important exceptions wor'th noting. 
First; the Senate bill contJ.ins tindillgs 
far more specific than the House. 
version. S. 20.80 makes the comparison 
between the consumers right-to-know 
"whether food contains artitlciJ.lcolors 
~nd flavors, chemi<;al preservJ.tives, and 
,artitlcial sweeteners by requiring the ' 
l.lbding of such food." This tlnding 
clearly draws the paralic! between the 
labeling rClluirements f()r food 
'additives, and the lack thereof f()r , 
g~netil:ally engineered material. Thc 
House version does riot make such an 
explicit finding; Both bills tind that the 
labeling would givc consumers, the . . 
control that they lack when deciding if 
they want to plirchase genetically 
eHgineercd food. 
The ·second· significant diffi:rence 
between the House and the Senate 
version is the labehhat would appq.r 
on the toods. 
S. 20.80 would require the following 
label: 
GE~ETICALLY ENGINEERED. 
THIS PRODUCT CO~TAINS 
. GENETICALLY ENGINEERED 
MATElUAL, OR WAS PRODUCED 
. V.rITH A GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED MATERIAL. 
The noticeable difference is the lack of 
the phrase "UNITED STATF~~ 
GOVERNMENT NOTICE," This 
phrase is akin to a warning, though it 
purports to be a "notice." To a 
consumer the notic~ might appear t<> 
add a Idel of protocol that indicates ' 
that the product is somehow unsafe. 
The proposed Senate label seems to be 
mOI'e neutral, and more aligned with 
the labels currently required fix food 
additives, such as sultites."1 
S. 2080 also all,ocated $5,000,000 in 
grants to research the effects of­
genetically dlgineerni foods,. This 
research is ob\'iously needed since both 
b,ills fail to allege that there are any 
actual health or environl11ental threats 
from genetically engineered prod Ul:tS. 
On the adl'ninistrati\'e front, the FDA 
announced in May that it would ' 
develop guidelines to r. a voluntary 
labeling program,hlThe labels will 
simply state, in a truthfid and 
straightfc)rward manner, if theprodul:t , 
or ingredients contain genctically 
,modified organism, The draft labeling 
guidelines will be developed with focus 
groups and presented for public 
comment. 
Conclusion 
· . he FDA recently announced its . 
guidelines for voluntary labeling of 
foods that do not contain GMOs, The 
public position on genetically 
. engineered foods, as expressed in 
Congress, seems to be that th~' se 
products n..:ed to be labeled in ord r 
tor the consumer to make an int(>nned 
decision. Sh(luld this congressiqnal 
initiative pass, the cOllsumer will have 
an ,tdditional piece of inf(mnation to 
contemplate when purchasing food. 
Whether or not these labels will e 
tnlly important to the consumer in 
making a purchasing decision remains 
to be seen. Similarly, whetht'r or not 
these labels will hdp or hinder the 
advent of this new tei.:hnolob»' rcmains' 
to be secn. 
- . 
T
A question that remains unalls\ven:d in 
this debate over labeling is whether 
labeling the manufacturing pmcess, . 
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sllch as GE fixxis and rSST, wilt 
diminish the ·rDA's objective of 
providing conSlIlllers with o nly the 
material ailli cssential inf(mnation . 
Given the lack of scientit"k: evi(knce 
that genetically engineered plants posc 
a risk""' label ing the presencc ofa . 
gcnetic'ally moditied matl' ri:ll "would 
incorrectly signal to con!>umt'ts· th:lt rhe 
govenlll1cnt belie\'~s therc is somelh ing 
to worry about - or, at least, that there· 
is somcthing funda mentally ditlc re nt . 
about such products. " ,.j Ov<:r-Iabding 
a prod uct is ak.in to crying wolf - the 
importanc(' of rC:l1 warnings will be 
lost. FDA has bee.n trying to kl'cp this 
from bappening by keeping il11111;tterial 
. infurn1Jtion orf the label. 
Precautiol1:1ry labeling is not neccssary, 
as the market f()rces will provide .the 
intcre.sted .md conccrned consumer 
with those products that will tout 
themselvcs as Ilot containing geIleti~ally . 
altl:n:d materials~ The new organic label 
picks lip where the lack of a 
"gcnetically ¢ngineen:d" labd leavcs 
off. Under thc USDA's ~ational 
Organic Standards, "organic" product 
cannot be labeled as such ifit cOiu.ains 
a genetically engineered orhr;lI1ism. 
Consllmers who do not want to 
purchase a genetically engineen:d 
product will 'be in the same positiclI1 as 
a consumer who does not want to 
purchase food that has been grown 
using pesticides. The market will. react 
to conslimer desire to pUrdlJSe "pure" 
f()ods, thus rendning 11100t the nced 
for n~andatory genetically engincered 
. labeling. Some major grocery chains, 
such as Whole Foo~.is Market, have 
pledged to provide their consumers 
\\'ith information about which of their 
pn·)ducts do not contain genetically 
modit'ied organisms, when that 
information is available, in an attempt 
to keep their shdws free of genetically 
t'ngineer~dproducts. This trend is sure 
to continue as long as the market 
pr 'pels ·it. 
J,abeling something where there is 

currently no data demonstrating that 

. thcse products arc materially ifferl;nt 
might cirtly produce an unfounded 
aversion and suspiciOli . of these 
products ill the consume'r's mind: The 
inLreased cost ;lssociated \\;ith "organic" 
. products may be prohibitivc to lo\\,­
income ·individilals, thus lea\'ing lh is 
gro!JP keling that they arc the gui nea 
pigs fC.lt thesc products while highL'r­
incomc individuals can avoid these 
p roducts. In additio n tl c potcntial pi<l ~ 
. against the c products iii the 
marketplace is ·that consumer rdu\.tancc 
to purcil,ise the prodlll:t· n!llld stymie 
technological advancements that could 
provide bendlcial pl'oducts to the 
world agriculrW'al community. 
The FD A, in COI1!:rast to the EC and 
interllario.nal community, h.1S rl'acht'd . 
theconect balance or intl;rests bv 
oldopting J voluntary labeling regime 
fix foods that do not co!ltain C;MO s. 
This allows wil l allo".' consumers \\'ho 
arc conccrned with ·liMOs to avoid 
them in thl·.marketplace. At the same 
time iL J\'()ids the implication, 'that 
comes with ,Yarning labels, that rlll:re i~ 
s()mething inherently dangen;us with 
GMOs, .l pllsition that is not qlid.1ted 
bv current 'scientific data . The fDA 
voluntary labeling policy can be \;ewl'd 
as an example of the precaulioilJrv 
principk in action both in terms of 
consumer health and economic ,·iabllitv 
of tile emerging GMt) industry. 
L :-. \ 
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DURWOOD ZAELKE is an Adj(lI1ct Professor, Director . 
of the Joint Research Program on .International and 
Comparative En\'ironmental Law at WeL, and the 
President and Founder ot'the Center tor International 
Environmental law (CIEL). He recently taught tc)r a 
semester at Yale Law School. In addition, ProtCssor 
Zaelke. was appointed Director of the Secretariat for ,the 
Inrernat:ional Network for Cotnpliance a'nd 
Entlxcement, a project jointly~nded by the Dutch 
and U.S. en\'ironmental protection agencies. ' He was 
also elected to·tC>llnding board of the National 
Association of En\'ironmental Law Societies. Professor 
. " 
Zaelke is currently. working on the second edition of his 
best selling text book International En\'ironmental Law 
(David Hunter, J:l1nes Salzman, Durwood Zaelke) 
JAMES SALZMAN, an Associate Professor of Law at 
the Washington College of Law (WCL), has recently 
guest lectured on \'arious issues of both U.S. and' 
international e:m'ironmental law at' Harvard, the 
University of Houston, Stantc)rd, the University of 
Indiana, the Uni\'ersity of Lund in Sweden, and 
Georgeto\vn. In addition he gave ~ presentation before 
the Nation.ll Re:se,lrch Council. He rec<.;ntly published. , 
'~Earth in the Judicia~ BalailCe~" in The Nation; "Labor 
Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and 
Influence of the Organization tc)r Economic 
Coopcr'ation and Development," in the Michigan 
Journal of International Law; and "Currencies aild ~he 
Commodification of Environmental Law," in the 
Stanford Law 'Review. 
PERRY WALLACE, a Professor of Law at WCL, IS 
curreqtlv directing an environmental, ju~tice project for 
the Marshall Heights Community Development 
Organiz.~tion 's Communi!)'. Health and Wellness 
Initiative, The Marshall Heights project will assist the 
organization in ~stablishing a commurii!)' -basedsystem 
for (1) identi/)'ing and ITIonit?ring relevant 
environmental developments, (2) participating in . 
env-ironmental dedsion making, and (3) raking action 
necessary to combat pollution-based threats to the 
health and wdlness of its citizens. 
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PAUL HAGEN, an Adjunct Protessor at WCL and 

Principle at Ben-ridge & Diamond, cO-c!lJired"the two 

day Ameri~an Law Institute/ American Bar Association 
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Washington .pc. In addition he pre.s~nted on the topic 

of international regulation of biotechnology. 

MICHAEL P. WALLS, an Adjunct Professor at weL and 

Senior Coul1se,l for the American Chemistry Council, : 

.gave a presentation on Hazardous Chemicals and r­
Wa~'te: P~-ior In~cl1'med C6nscilt (PI C), Persistent 
Organized Pollutants (POPs), the Montreal Protocol, m 
Glohal Harmonized Svstem for Classification and :::::J 
Labeling (GHS), and the Basel Convention at the <. 
ALI/ ABA Course on International Environmental Law ,-­
...in Washington, DC. o 
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ERIC DANNENMAIER, an Adjunct Associate Lectu'rc at 

WeL recently co-authored "Achieving Mcaningfi.11 
 3 
C01l1plrancc with Global Climate Change CD C~mmitments,'.' fiJr the I'nv Center 011 Global Climate 

Change. In addition he recen lly published <4Mceting :::::J 

-
~ Sustainable Development Commitments in the: 

Americas -Progress to Date, Le~ldtrship Council f()r C 

Inter-American Summitry Policy Paper," tCll' the North- . 

South Center Press and '''Regional Security and 
-n 

Environmental Governancc in the Americas," tor the 
 C 
Canadian Foundation tClr Latin America Policy Paper 

(.fOCAL). n 

c
-
BILL COHEN is ;111 Adjtinct Prokssor Jnd consultant at .~ 
WeL. He is developing riew courses in both 

Biotechnology and Comparative Environmental Inlpact 
 c:Assessment. Protessor Cohen prl~viously was Chief of 

the General Litigati()n Section Environment of the -C 

Natural Reso~ll'Ce Divis,ion at the Department of Justice 
 C­
from 1986 to 2000. hom 197 I to 1986 he served as a
' . . 
Trial Attorney, and later as Assistant Chief, fi)phe O 
Section. He was .an Associate at Debovoise and ~. (I)Liherman from· 1970 to 1971 and an Attljrney in the 

Appellate Section of the ENR Division ofDoJ from' 

. 1965 to 1970.1)rofessor Cohen has lectured at Geurge 
Washington, Cornell , Vermont Law School,' Duke and ' 
the Graduate School d~ the Departmel1tof Agricultun;. ' 
He is a regtdar instructor at the American Law 
Institute-American Bar Association course un 
EnViron menta l Risk Management in Business TI
Comparative Environmental Im pact Assessment, 5-9, I';'oom 603 
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Envionrmental La\\,. In addition he s the recipient of 
numerous awards' indudiilg the Natural Re~ourct's Council's 
National Em'ironmental Quality Award and the· Attorney . 
Gt'neral\ Distinguished' Servic~ Award. 
DON ~OLDBERG, an AdJunci llrot\:ssor at W(L and a 
Senior Attorney at the Cel'lter tlJr International 
Em'ironmentall;}\\' (ClEO', participated in the Climate 
negotiations in Ly()n, France Jnd the Sixth :ontCrencc of 
the Parties to the United Nations framcwork Co.nn:ntion on 
Climate Change at The Hague. In ·addition, ProtCSSlll' 
G()ldberg presented at the ABA/ WeI. Post-COP6 Panel in' 
WashingtoLl , DC. 
KEN MARKOWITZ, Adjunct Pi'otCssOI: at weI, tCJl1nded 
EarthPace, U;,C (www.earthpace.com ) ,md s<:rn:s as its 
President: EarthPace designs \Veb (ol11lliunication systems 
and te,Khing materials i.n order to .improve environmental 
decisi()11 making ;lI1d advance education. In addition', 
Prokssor Markowitz is a Seni'or Attorney at the Center te)r 
In.fcrnational EIH"ironmental Ll\\' {CIEL) where he is ­
directing '\ N, SA ti rndcd project to dn'clop Environmental 
Legal .' ntcxmaric·JIl S~'s l c ms (ELIS) aimed at. bilild ing better 
gl()bal ell\ 'ironl1lental management by integrating earth 
s\'stel1l science and technolo,,\' with 
. to. en~'ir()nl1lental 1a\~!S and . , 
policies, The U nivcrsity of Maryl~lIld Baltimore County 
(UMBC) is a partn r in this project along with GEL, the 
US Library uf Congress, • TASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center, all(j the Universities Space R~seJrch Associatioll. for 
1l1~)rc infi.)rmation about ELIS visit '. 
http://athena.csee . umbc.edll:9080/ELIS/in~kx j.p. 
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January 
. 17-20: . Eight Session ofWorking Group I of the Imergovemmental Panel 011 Climate Change (IPee), Shanghai, ( :hina. (~\'\\'W. ipc.:.ch) 
29-31 : . Joint FAO/WHO Expert COIlslIltation on Emillating Food Satety: Science and Ethics, Rome, Italy. (Contact Mr. BOlluif at 39 
657052753) ' . 
February 
1-28: Technical Expert. Group on Marine and Coastal Protected Areas in Leigh, ~e\\' Zealand. (Contact Mr. Halil(hlllah Zedan Jt 
secretariat@bioiliv.org) . '. 
5-9: 21st SeSsion of the UNEP tnl\'erning Council in NJ.irobi, Kenya. (Contact Mr. S.A. Miller at millerb@lInep.org) 
12: ' Organization,u Session of the United Nations Fomm on Forests'in ~e"i York, United States. Contact Ms. Tiina V:ihancn at 
\ 'ahanen@lIn.org. 
19 ­ 23: International Conference of the Invasive Species Specialist Group ofIUCN inAuckland, New. Zealand. Contact S(c@hq.iucn ,org. 
26 ­ March 2: Committee on Fisheries (COFI) in Rome Italy. More 'uilimTIation availabfc at http://\\'\\'W.tao.org. , 
26 - Mard12: Ad Hoe Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Expcrts on Energy and Slmaul.lblt: [)('\'clopmel't in New York. IntrJrrn.ltion 
available at http://\\'\\'\\·.wl.org/ esa/ sustdev. 
March 
5-16: Ad Hoc Inrer-Scssional Working Groups ofthc UN Commission on Sustain.lble \)cn:lopmcnt .in ~~\V York. Cont.l(t Mr. L£hra 
Aydul at aydin@Un.org . 
12-16: ,Sixth Meetingofthc Scicntific TeclUlicai and Technological Ad\ice (SBS1TA-6) in Montreal, Can<1da. Contact Mr. Hamdallah 
Zedan at secretaJiar@biodiv.org. . 
12- I 6 : FAO Committee on Forcso'Y (COFG) in Rome; Italy. More informaiton J\'aibble Jt http://\\'\\'\\'.fJo.org. 
'14: Third IntC!rri'ltional Marine'Sah'age Confi=renee, London, u.K. Contact. associ.ltionsscr\'icesl l1!A:()l11pu~er\'c . colll. 
19-23: Interim Chemical Rc\;ew COlTlluittt:e IOnhe Rimerdam Convention ()n the Applkation ofthe Prior Infimlled Conscnt Pnxxdurc tilr 
CertJ.in . HazardtllL~ Chemic,Us and l'c'\tiLidcs in lmem.ltional Tr.lde in Rome, I.taly. (~)(1tJCt Mr. W~l'\\'al at 39 6 570517.53. ' 
26-30: FAC> Committee on Agriculture (COAG) - 16dl Session in Rome, Italy. Contai:t Me KUenem<111 at 39 0657052287. 
April 
2-6: Codex COrQmittce on P~slicide Residues .It Thc Hague, ~etherlands. Comact Mr. Randellt at 39 06 57052753. 
24' GEeD Education Ministers Meetings in Paris , h.1l1ce. Contact ne\\'s.LOnt'l(t@oecd.org. 
35: Oceanology Intemational :\meric.1s Exhibition and Conocrcnce 2001, Mi.lmi, FI.. Contact oiJ.ll1cril·Js@speafhcad.co.uk. 
Int(lrmation 'lnilable at \\'\\w.oiamericas.com. , 
5-6: International Suslainable Dn'c1opmcnr Rcsc,trch Con!Cn:nu' 200 I, Manchester, UK. C:Olll.Kt c1aine@t-rpcrJ\'.del11011.co.uk. 
Information a\·.1ilable at \n\'\\·.c:.rpel1\ironment.org" 
16-27: ~inth Session of the CommissiolJ on Sustainable De\'c1opn1l'nt, New York. Contact Mr.ZehrJ Aydin at .wdini(i!illl .org. 
23-27: FAO Cominission Oil .Genetil: Resourc~s ttlr h xxi Jnd Agricuinlre in Rome" haly, Infixm<ltion a\ ..tilablc .1t 
http://w\\'w.fuo.org. . 
30 - NLly 4: FA9 c<immittee on F(xx:i aJld L1belling (29th Session) in Onawa, CUlada. Inl(lImation ,I\'<tilable at1ltip:/ / \\'\\w.tao.org. ' 
.May 
'4-8: 45th Meeting ofthe CITES Standjng COl11l11ittt:c in Gene\'a, SwitzerlJnd. ConrJct cit~s@unep.ch 
16-18: GECD Environment Ministers Meeting and Annual OECD Council ~keting at Ministcriall.c\'c1 in Paris, h.lllc~ . Contact 
news.contact@oeed.org . ' . ' 
11-24: Internationa:1 Contl:rence on Biodi\'ersitv Jild Soc,ietv at Columbia Universit\, in ~e\\ York, Unired StJtt~s . C()n~Cl '\'Is . Christine 
A1&n-~orodom CaltsenBor(x.iOn'l@aol.~on1· . 
. 21-25: Medium Term Meeting ( ollSultJtive Group on International .Agriculnlr,u Research in 'DlIru.1l1, South AITica. Contact t\'ls . 
Frawla Hall at cgiar@worldbank.org. ' . 
'21-JilOeI: 14th SessiOllofthe Subsidiary Bodies (SBI and SBSIA) u.~ Fra'mework Convention on C1il11,~ te Chang~in Bonn, Gl'rm.U1~'. 
Contact Ms. Isabelle Colincau at ieOW1CJU@Unfccc.de. 
22-23: Diplomatic COllterence on a Legally Binding Instrument tor Implementing Intl'rnJuonal Action on Certain Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (DI1'COM) in Stockholm, Sw~den. (:ontact Mr. Jim ~Villis .tt j\\illis@ullep.ch. " 
.Calendar Links 
Unted N ! 
"A work of extensive breath and great sophistication.·... 
Destined· to become ·.the standard reference in the .field~" · 
James"Gustave Speth, Dia11 Yale School ofFo1·est1·Y altd ElIviron~erltal SeitltCe 
. . . 
"Certain to become the most widely adopted text in the field." · 
Christopher Stone, Roy P Crocker Professor ofLall'. UniJltrsity ofSotlthC1:" Calij'()17Iia . . . 
HUNTER, SALZMAN &ZAELKE 

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
A~ a rcferenc.e ixx)k, the teX[ is indispensable fc)r those who wish to gain a·bcner understanding of the fi)rces rcslxlI1sible for our g1ob-.il environmental 

problEms, in addition to the specific ltgal responses that are already reshaping the way governments, businesses, and civil society interact. A:s a textlXx>k, 

. the careful org~zation and compn::hensive SC()pc allows. professors to design courses that fit their interests and background. Clear and engaging 

writing, combined with numerous probkm exercises, makes dle text easy to usc t(lr both pmfessors and students. 
"Part One (503 pages) discusses the problems, players, and principles thai:· shape dle legal discourse. Part Two (662 page;) presents the science, 
.ewnomics, and politics of spccifie-g1obai cll\~mnmcntal problenL~, along widl dle specific legal responses . . Part'Threc (338 pages) analyzes the 
relationship between international en\i~onmentallaw and other legal regimes; including Trade and Irivestment, Human Rights, Nationa!&cnrity, and 
Corporate Codes of Conduct. . 
A Treaty Supplement is· available (softeover; 393 pages). Additional material and updates arc availablE at the textbook web·site k)und at 
\\ww.wcl.american.edujpub/IEL. . . . . . 
'4Not only the b~t, mostcomprehensive reference book available today, . 
but also a major ·work of scholarship." 
. . 
jonathtm Lash) President, World Resources Institute' 
.. 
To order, call 1-800-917-7377 by contacting steve.errick@westgroup.com. 
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